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INFORMED MISDEMEANOR SENTENCING
Jenny Roberts*

I.

INTRODUCTION

There is no such thing as a low-stakes misdemeanor. The deceptive
thing about misdemeanor sentencing is that the punishment the judge
actually imposes in court is not the main event, in the long run.1 As
many people find out long after they exit the courthouse, a misdemeanor
conviction—indeed, even a dismissed misdemeanor charge—is a mark
that follows them into their work and home lives for decades, and
sometimes for the rest of their lives.2 A misdemeanor conviction can
lead to the inability to continue working as a home health aide even after
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Holland and Juliet Stumpf, and to Eugene Mok and Alissa Kalinowski for excellent research
assistance.
1. Although the actual misdemeanor sentence imposed can be quite significant. In Maryland,
for example, assault in the second degree is a misdemeanor that encompasses the common law
crimes of intent to frighten, attempted battery, and battery and that carries a sentence of up to ten
years imprisonment. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 3-201(b), -203(b) (LexisNexis 2017);
Pryor v. State, 6 A.3d 343, 357 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010). Further, judges can do harm in
sentencing even on relatively minor offenses. Michael Peters, CJC No. 04-1044-CC (Tex. Comm’n
on Judicial Conduct May 4, 2006) (noting that a judge was disciplined for ordering a woman
convicted of animal abuse to thirty days in jail with three days of bread and water and a man
convicted of illegally dumping toxic torts to drink toxic sludge).
2. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV.
611, 617-18 (2014) (“Rather than rely on evidence of guilt in the individual case at hand,
misdemeanor courts sort defendants based largely upon records of prior encounters.”); Devah Pager,
The Mark of a Criminal Record, in CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 937, 960-62 (William T. Lyons,
Jr., ed., 2006); Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans
Find Consequences Can Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2014, 10:30 PM)
http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-arrest-records-rise-americans-find-consequences-can-last-a-lifetime1408415402; Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Fighting to Forget: Long After Arrests, Criminal
Records Live On, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 25, 2014, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fighting-toforget-long-after-arrests-records-live-on-1419564612.
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many years in the profession, or difficulty securing other employment
because of the background checks that most employers now run.3 It can
lead to loss of public housing for an individual’s entire family, and
difficulty finding private housing because of the background checks that
most landlords now run.4 Often called “collateral consequences,”5 these
repercussions of criminal cases have also been labeled “invisible
punishments” and “hidden consequences.”6
Whatever the label or the underlying motivation for the
consequences, the often life-long effects of even a minor criminal charge
have become particularly pernicious over the past decade. This shift is
due largely to the confluence of three events. First, the volume of
misdemeanors has more than doubled nationwide between 1972 and
2013, from about five to about thirteen million new misdemeanor cases
per year.7 Second, criminal records are now widely available online—
usually for free—and employers, landlords, and others are accessing this
data for purposes they never would have considered if it still required a
trip to the local courthouse.8 Relatedly, commercial data aggregators buy
3. See MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS, & CECELIA KLINGELE, COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY, & PRACTICE chs. 5-6 (2016).
4. Id. § 2:17.
5. Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 2015 WISC. L.
REV. 321, 327 (“Collateral consequences are the purportedly nonpunitive, noncriminal
consequences that can flow automatically or as a matter of discretion from a criminal conviction.”);
see also Alec C. Ewald & Marine Smith, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions in
American Courts: The View From the State Bench, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 145, 145 (2008) (defining
collateral consequences as “restrictions, penalties, and sanctions generally not included in penal
codes or sentencing guidelines, but resulting from criminal convictions under U.S. state and federal
law”).
6. See, e.g., McGregor Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word: A Criminal Defense Attorney’s
Guide to Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy Strategy, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 479, 480-87
(2005). Although these consequences have also been called “unintended,” they are in fact quite
deliberate, even if the legislators or regulators who put them into place may not have realized how
broadly and deeply they would take effect. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 186 (rev. ed. 2012); DAVID GARLAND, THE
CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 180-82 (2001).
7. See Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, Misdemeanors by the Numbers, B.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (on file with author); see also ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., MINOR
CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 11
(2009) (describing rise from five to ten million misdemeanors filed per year between 1972 and
2006). Although misdemeanor statistics are infamously difficult to obtain, particularly on a
nationwide basis, it is possible that there has been a slight decline in misdemeanors filed since 2016.
See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF
STATE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF 2015 STATE COURT CASELOADS 11 (2016),
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/microsites/files/csp/ewsc%202015.ashx (noting a “slow but
steady decline from 2006 to 2014” in total criminal caseloads, but failing to separate out felony and
misdemeanor statistics).
8. See Thomas Ahearn, SHRM Surveys Reveal 3 Out Of 4 Businesses Conduct Reference
Background Checks and Criminal Background Checks, EMP. SCREENING RESOURCES (Mar. 23,
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and sell criminal records for background checks and other uses.9 Finally,
legislatures have created myriad barriers to employment, licensing, and
other areas based on a person’s criminal history.10
On a typical day in a misdemeanor courtroom, an observer might
witness the following scenarios, which highlight the need for close
attention to misdemeanor sentencing. One man comes in front of the
judge on charges of shoplifting food, standing next to a defense lawyer
he met that morning during a rushed conversation through the bars of the
courthouse holding area. Defense counsel explains that her client just
spent the week in jail due to his inability to post the $500 cash bail. The
judge then offers to sentence the defendant to twelve hours of
community service should he plead guilty. The defendant enters the plea,
the judge imposes the sentence, and the defendant walks out of the
external door of the courtroom. He is completely unaware that the theft
conviction means he will shortly thereafter lose his job in retail, and will
find it difficult to get a new job with his name and conviction in a
public database. The judge and defense counsel are also unaware of
these consequences. Later that day, in the same courtroom, the judge
2010), http://www.esrcheck.com/wordpress/2010/03/23/shrm-surveys-reveal-3-out-of-4-businessesconduct-reference-background-checks-and-criminal-background-checks (describing survey of
employers where 73% reported performing criminal background checks on all job candidates).
9. These aggregators sell their data in settings ranging from legitimate background screening
for sensitive employment to mugshots.com-type websites. See Sarah E. Lageson et al., Legal
Ambiguity in Managerial Assessments of Criminal Records, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 175, 180
(2015) (reporting that approximately 80% of employers outsource criminal background checks to
private companies). The fact that criminal records are often incomplete (e.g., ultimate outcome of
case not noted, even if it was dismissed) or even incorrect, compounds the problems an individual
can face from having his record so widely available. Some records continue to show up in databases
even years or decades after they have been officially expunged, when background checkers fail to
delete them because they are not properly updating. See Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven
Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 882, 885-86 (2017) (discussing problems of
criminal records databases such as record errors where “public sites might suggest that an individual
has a criminal record . . . when in fact that is not true”). The FBI criminal records database is also
replete with errors—and many employers mandated by law to run a background check are permitted
to use this database to obtain a criminal history. See OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT ON CRIMINAL HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS 6, 1618, 100 (2006) (discussing how FBI database has incomplete data and how “[n]o single source
exists that provides complete and up-to-date information about a person’s criminal history”); see
also MADELINE NEIGHLY & MAURICE EMSELLEM, THE NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WANTED:
ACCURATE FBI BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 5, 8 (2013) (describing how
approximately half of the records in the FBI database, which compiles criminal records from state
databases, “are incomplete and fail to provide information on the final outcome of an arrest); id.
(describing how the FBI criminal records database was used for almost seventeen million
employment and licensing background checks in 2012).
10. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1829(a)(1) (2012) (barring individuals convicted of a crime of
dishonesty, breach of trust, or money laundering from any work in a bank—including working for
contractors who, for example, clean the bank—absent a waiver from the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation). This section has been interpreted so that “convicted” includes pre-plea diversion.
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imposes a ninety-day jail sentence in a similar shoplifting case. In this
case, the defendant has a prior conviction for misdemeanor theft and
received a thirty-day sentence in that prior case.
In the neighboring courtroom, another defendant is out on bail and
making his third court appearance on a misdemeanor assault charge.
Unable to afford private counsel, yet above the income cutoff for a
public defender, the defendant speaks directly with the prosecutor, who
offers to recommend a no-jail sentence should the defendant plead guilty
to the lower-level misdemeanor charge of disorderly conduct. The local
custom in the jurisdiction is that judges will accept charge bargains but
not sentence bargains—meaning that every guilty plea to an agreed-upon
charge (here, the disorderly conduct) is then subject to a separate
sentencing determination by the judge, with consideration but no
promises given to the parties’ recommendations or requests. In this case,
the prosecutor requests one year of probation, with no jail time. The
defendant declines to speak at sentencing, not sure what he should add.
The judge glances briefly at the defendant, then says something like:
“I am sentencing you to the statutory maximum of one year
incarceration.” Very long pause. Shuffling of papers. Looking
down, then looking up, “I’ll suspend all but 10 days.” Long
pause, more paper shuffling. “With credit for the 10 days you
already served before making bail.”
Only then does the judge go on to impose probation, a few conditions of
that probation, a fine, and court costs.
When that case ends, the judge is faced with a young man charged
with trespass in a public park, for playing basketball after posted closing
hours. He is incarcerated on an arrest warrant, after failing to appear on a
summons that was mailed to an old address two years ago. He no longer
lives in the state, but was arrested during a traffic stop while driving
through the county. After hearing about the residency and address
change from the defendant (who is not represented by counsel), the
judge suggests that the prosecution enter a nolle prosequi11 on the case.
When the prosecutor declines to do so without further time to
investigate, the judge exercises her statutory authority to dismiss “de
minimis” prosecutions.12 She also adheres to a state court rule requiring
11. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., MD RULES, Rule 4-247(a) (West 2017) (“The State’s Attorney
may terminate a prosecution on a charge and dismiss the charge by entering a nolle prosequi on the
record in open court.”).
12. See Anna Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (“Nineteen
states have given trial courts the power to dismiss prosecutions for the sake of justice. Whether
granting a power to dismiss ‘in furtherance of justice,’ or a power to dismiss ‘de minimis’
prosecutions, these statutes allow judges to determine that while a case is permitted in criminal
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her to advise the defendant that he may seek an expungement based on
the dismissal.13 The case is dismissed, the defendant is released, and he
immediately files an expungement petition with the court clerk.
Finally, in a third courtroom another defendant also faces minor
theft charges. He decides to enter a guilty plea. As the judge moves into
the sentencing portion of the proceeding, defense counsel makes an
argument for a sentence of probation before judgment (“PBJ”). In this
jurisdiction, a PBJ stays the judgment of conviction and, upon successful
completion of probation and any conditions, results in discharge of the
case without a judgment of conviction.14 At the sentencing proceeding,
the judge grants counsel’s request to allow the defendant’s employer to
address the court, and the employer tells the judge that he considers the
defendant to be one of his best workers. The defendant then offers a
compelling statement about his regret for his actions and the need for the
PBJ to avoid a conviction that will hurt his future employment
prospects. The prosecutor takes no position on sentencing. The judge
grants the PBJ.
These hypothetical but realistic15 scenarios illustrate several things
about the judge’s role in misdemeanor sentencing. First, judges have
enormous discretion in misdemeanor sentencing, guided only by the
statutory maximum in most jurisdictions. One year in jail, or a fully
suspended sentence? Three years of supervised probation with drug
treatment, or six months of unsupervised probation? In many
jurisdictions, that discretion encompasses mechanisms that might
ultimately lead to a non-conviction outcome or even outright dismissal,
as described in the last two scenarios. The judge’s discretion is
particularly broad relative to the generally low-level to non-existent
social harm of many misdemeanor offenses. Second, there are a variety
of systemic and structural impediments to the proper exercise of
discretion in misdemeanor sentencing, such as bail practices that are
unfair to poor defendants, restrictions on the right to counsel, and
prosecutorial failure to exercise discretion in charging. Third, there are
circumstances—such as playing basketball in a park after hours—that
challenge notions of any underlying justification or purpose of
punishment, or even of any conviction for a crime. Fourth, judges are
court, it should not be pursued.”).
13. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., MD RULES, Rule 4-329 (requiring judge to advise defendant
that he “may be entitled to expunge” court and police records when case ends in “acquittal,
dismissal, probation before judgment, nolle prosequi, or stet”).
14. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 6-220 (defining probation before judgment).
15. These scenarios are compositely drawn from my experiences as a public defender and
clinical professor supervising students in three very different jurisdictions, as well as my
observations during visits to lower criminal courts in a number of other jurisdictions.
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too often unaware of the myriad so-called collateral consequences that
can flow from a conviction on even minor charges, such as loss of
employment and housing opportunities.16 This unawareness means that
judges miss the opportunity to sentence, when a sentence is justified, in
an informed manner that accounts for the full range of punishment an
individual experiences because of a misdemeanor conviction.17
These scenarios show how significant the sentencing phase can be
for misdemeanors. Sentencing is also a significant event in many felony
cases, which is perhaps why so much attention is paid to punishment for
more serious crimes.18 Criminal law textbooks all discuss the purposes
and theories of punishment, but they mainly focus on high-level crimes
like homicide.19 Moreover, public discourse has largely concentrated on
things like disproportionately severe sentences in felony drug cases and
mandatory minimums. Many legislative reform efforts have been
similarly focused. Public defenders direct their limited and overextended resources to clients with felony charges.20 Sentencing
jurisprudence grapples with issues that are generally applicable only to
felony cases,21 or with the death penalty.22
16. See infra notes 38-39, 87.
17. Although I use the term “misdemeanor conviction,” individuals can suffer many collateral
consequences of a misdemeanor arrest. See Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809,
820-25 (2015).
18. Nancy Gertner, Federal Sentencing Guidelines - A View from the Bench, 29 HUM. RTS. 6,
6 (2002) (“Sentencing a defendant is—or should be—one of the most important moments in the
criminal justice system. After all, it is when state power confronts an individual. With my words of
authorization, a citizen’s liberty is extinguished, often for extraordinary periods of time.”).
19. See, e.g., CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA P. HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
181-200, 232-48 (3d ed. 2014). There is little to no coverage of misdemeanors as a category in first
year criminal law textbooks, so this gap extends beyond sentencing. There is indirect discussion of
minor crimes in such areas as the constitutional limits on punishment (e.g., status crime
prohibitions) and strict liability (e.g., regulatory offenses), but little else. Id.
20. Irene Joe, Rethinking Misdemeanor Neglect, 64 UCLA L. REV. 738, 750 (2017) (“Some
public defender agencies . . . allocate attorney experience in a manner such that it is
disproportionately dedicated to clients charged with felony offenses.”). Although Gideon v.
Wainwright applied the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to state courts, there was no federal
constitutional right to misdemeanor counsel until 1972, when the Supreme Court extended the Sixth
Amendment to misdemeanor cases involving imprisonment. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25, 34-37, 40 (1972) (“We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person
may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he
was represented by counsel at his trial.”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340-45 (1963).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296 (2004); see also Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (holding that even juveniles
convicted of homicide offenses must receive an individualized sentencing hearing accounting for
relevant mitigating factors); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment forbids sentence of life without parole for juveniles who commit non-homicide
offenses).
22. See, e.g., Buck v. Davis, No. 15-8049, slip op. at 21-24, 26 (Feb. 22, 2017) (reversing and
remanding lower court conviction of capital murder and death sentence based on lower court abuse
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Despite this overwhelming attention on felonies, most criminal
cases are misdemeanors. Misdemeanors are now eighty percent of many
criminal court dockets.23 Most sentencing is misdemeanor sentencing,24
and most defendants experience sentencing as the significant event in a
misdemeanor case (at least up until that point in the process).25 If the
prosecutor dismisses or defers charges, the judge plays almost no role.26
When there is a conviction, it usually flows from a hasty guilty plea
where the judge asks some boilerplate questions, and perhaps the
prosecutor proffers the facts that they would have proven had the case
gone to trial.27 The sentencing often immediately follows, and it is
sometimes the only moment when the process slows down enough to
look something like an adjudicatory proceeding. The prosecutor gives a
sentence recommendation (perhaps with reasons), defense counsel
makes her presentation (if the defendant has counsel), and the defendant
also has the opportunity to speak. On occasion, family members,
victims, law enforcement involved in the case, or others will speak. The
judge may ask questions before handing down the sentence.28
This description, while generic, illustrates how sentencing is a core
judicial function in the lower criminal courts. Indeed, with the vast
majority of misdemeanor convictions coming from a guilty plea,
of discretion).
23. Victor Eugene Flango, Judicial Roles for Modern Courts, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. COURTS,
http://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/future-trends-2013/home/Monthly-Trends
-Articles/Judicial-Roles-for-Modern-Courts.aspx (stating that “[a]pproximately 80 percent of
criminal cases are misdemeanors”) (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
24. Although given high dismissal rates in some lower criminal courts, many misdemeanor
cases never make it to the sentencing stage, particularly in high volume jurisdictions. See KohlerHausmann, supra note 2, at 641-42 & fig.8, 643 fig.9 (noting a dismissal rate of over 50% for
misdemeanors in New York City in 2011, although stating that 2011 was also “the recent peak of
misdemeanor arrests”).
25. As two commentators put it somewhat more crudely, albeit not in the specific context of
misdemeanors, “[s]entencing is where the criminal justice system cashes out.” Douglas A. Berman
& Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37, 43 (2006).
26. Cf. Valena E. Beety, Judicial Dismissal in the Interest of Justice, 80 MO. L. REV. 629,
653-55 (2015) (listing the seven states that have codified the right of judges to sua sponte dismiss
misdemeanor proceedings and the five states that allow judges to dismiss misdemeanor proceedings
“in the furtherance of justice”); Roberts, supra note 12.
27. Despite requirements that the factual basis for a guilty plea be placed on the record, many
lower court judges skip this step entirely. See BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 23 & tbl.13, 24
& tbls.14, 15, 16 & 17.
28. Having been a public defender in New York City, I fully realize that misdemeanor
sentencing often does not follow this path in high-volume urban courthouses, where judges may
simply—for the sake of expediency—go along with an agreed-upon charge and sentence bargain.
Further, as Issa Kohler-Haussman has demonstrated with respect to New York City, in high-volume
jurisdictions the processing of misdemeanor cases might lead to more deferred prosecutions or other
non-conviction dispositions, intended to mark individuals for a ratcheting-up of consequences in
any later contacts with the criminal justice system. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 2.

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 10

178

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:171

sentencing is often the real work of the lower court judge.29 Yet, little
specific attention is given to misdemeanor sentencing, and to the lower
criminal court judge’s broad discretion in sentencing.30
This may be because most misdemeanor sentences do not involve
jail time, and therefore are not viewed as important cases. It could also
be because in some jurisdictions, judges generally agree to bind
themselves to sentences that defense counsel and the prosecutor
negotiated during plea bargaining,31 which leaves these judges no
meaningful role in the sentencing process.
Perhaps so little attention is paid to misdemeanor sentencing
because in some jurisdictions a large percentage of misdemeanor
charges are eventually dismissed, so the judge never imposes a
sentence.32 The story of the high-volume, urban courthouse where all
actors are pressed to dismiss or quickly conclude misdemeanor cases to
keep dockets moving is a common story in the literature on the lower
criminal courts.33 While scholarship exploring that narrative is a critical
contribution to the lower criminal court literature, it is not the story of all
courthouses. In some jurisdictions, judges must exercise their discretion
and impose a sentence in a significant number of misdemeanor cases.
For example, Monroe County, New York—which encompasses the midsize City of Rochester—reported 10,522 dispositions in 2016 in cases
with a misdemeanor as the most serious arrest charge.34 Of these
dispositions, 5758 fell into the “Convicted-Sentenced” category. Of
these sentences, more than 14% consisted of jail time, another 3% to
29. Berman & Bibas, supra note 25 at 49 (“[B]ecause guilty pleas resolve most cases,
sentencing typically has served as the only trial-like procedure for most defendants.”).
30. Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Procedural Rights at Sentencing, 90 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 187, 200 (2014) (“Discretionary systems commit policy and application decisions to
the discretion of trial judges, who make those decisions in the context of individual sentencing.”).
31. Adam M. Gershowitz, Consolidating Local Criminal Justice: Should Prosecutors Control
the Jails?, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 677, 694 (2016) (noting how prosecutors sentence bargain in
misdemeanor cases). Despite sentence bargaining, some misdemeanor cases—particularly those
where the defendant is held on bail he cannot make, so that a guilty plea is the only way to get out—
are resolved with the defendant pleading guilty to the full set of charges and asking the judge for
leniency at sentencing. This reduces the role of the prosecutor to making a recommendation at
sentencing, which the judge can ignore or take into consideration.
32. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 2, at 647-49 (discussing misdemeanor dismissals in New
York City).
33. See, e.g., id. at 643 (“As the courts shifted away from the adjudicative model toward the
managerial model, criminal justice actors increasingly used the misdemeanor process to mark,
classify, and supervise people, often without securing a conviction or imposing a sentence.”); see
also Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1341-43 (2012).
34. N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERVICES, 2012-2016 DISPOSITIONS OF ADULT
ARRESTS, MONROE COUNTY (2017), http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/dispos/
monroe.pdf (identifying “dispositions” as “case outcomes reported to DCJS [Division of Criminal
Justice Services] by the Office of Court Administration as of April 21, 2017”).
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time served, and 4% to jail and probation or straight probation (both of
which can lead to more jail time, should there be a violation of
probation).35 In other words, of the more than 10,000 misdemeanor
dispositions in Monroe County in 2016, more than 2200 fell into one of
the significant sentencing categories of incarceration or probation.
Notably, another 1670 of the “Convicted-Sentenced” dispositions ended
in a sentence of a fine, which can also lead to incarceration down the
line—for failure to pay.36 In short, there is a lot of misdemeanor
sentencing happening in Monroe County, New York, and in many
other jurisdictions.
As described above, serious, long-lasting collateral consequences
continue long after completion of these sentences. As a matter of
constitutional law, many of the collateral consequences of a
misdemeanor conviction—unlike jail time, probation, a fine, or other
direct punishments allowed under the jurisdiction’s penal code—fall on
the civil rather than criminal side of the divide.37 That doctrinal reality,
however, does not change the way individuals experience collateral
consequences, and should not affect the fact that judges should consider
the full scope of consequences at sentencing. Yet, perhaps because of the
culture of expediency in most lower criminal courts,38 there is rarely
time taken to sufficiently explore (or to explore at all) the relevant
collateral consequences of misdemeanor charges. Because collateral
consequences are so poorly understood by criminal justice system actors,
and so rarely explained to individuals facing criminal charges, too often
there is serious and harmful underestimation of the true impact of a
misdemeanor conviction. These actors include the judge, who will
sentence in an uninformed manner without this crucial information.

35. Id.
36. Id. Almost 35% of the 10,522 total misdemeanor dispositions in 2015 in Monroe County,
New York were either “DA Declined to Prosecute” (0.2%), were dismissed outright (19.1%), or
were dismissed via New York State’s statutory deferral mechanism called an “Adjournment in
Contemplation of Dismissal” (15.4%). Id. While these numbers are not insignificant, they are
certainly lower than the more than 54% of all 2015 misdemeanor dispositions in New York City
that fell into these three categories. N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERVS., 2012-2016
DISPOSITIONS OF ADULT ARRESTS, NEW YORK CITY (2017), http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/
crimnet/ojsa/dispos/nyc.pdf.
37. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (analyzing the ex post facto Clause in a Sex
Offender Registration Act (“SORA”) case); Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7-8
(2003) (undertaking procedural due process analysis in SORA case). In the Sixth Amendment’s
right to counsel clause analysis, Padilla v. Kentucky blurred, but did not discard, the line between
collateral and direct consequences. 559 U.S. 356, 364 & n.8, 365 (2010) (“The disagreement over
how to apply the direct/collateral distinction has no bearing on the disposition of this case . . . .”).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 58-64.
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It is myopic, and contrary to the goals of prosecuting misdemeanor
offenses, to ignore the significant and lasting collateral effects of a
misdemeanor conviction. Under most theories of punishment, a judge at
sentencing does not simply look back to the crime and its circumstances
but also looks forward at the defendant’s future.39 Lower criminal court
judges need a more developed model for what it is they are trying to
accomplish at misdemeanor sentencing, and in particular need to look
forward at the collateral effects of a misdemeanor encounter with the
criminal justice system on the defendant’s future. Viewed through that
more expansive lens, and given the broad discretion of judges in
misdemeanor sentencing and lack of existing guidance for that
discretion, the sentencing function of judges in misdemeanor cases is in
serious need of close examination.
Part II of this Article contextualizes judicial responsibility for
misdemeanor sentencing in the realities of the lower criminal courts,
where there are a number of structural and systemic barriers to justice.
These barriers—which include violations of the right to counsel and
pressures on judges to move cases along rapidly—affect, but do not
excuse, the way judges go about sentencing. Part III considers the
purposes and theories underlying misdemeanor punishment, to better
inform the exercise of judicial discretion in misdemeanor sentencing.
First, Part III.A recognizes that there is no one coherent theory of
punishment even in the felony context, and that the dominant theory has
shifted in recent decades. For misdemeanor punishment, the underlying
justifications are even less clear; and for truly low-level misdemeanor
offenses, any punishment may be unjustified. Still, proportionality and
parsimony are consistent principles that are particularly relevant in the
misdemeanor context. Part III.B explores how misdemeanor sentencing
is discretionary sentencing. In general, a judge must simply sentence
consistent with the statute, which usually ranges from no further
criminal punishment to one year of imprisonment.40 Yet, other than these
39. While a pure retributivist approach to sentencing might only look back to the offense
itself and the circumstances at the time it was committed to determine the deserved burden to
impose through punishment, in reality judges imposing sentences—while they may differ in the
weight they put on backward- and forward-looking circumstances—are not following any one
theoretical approach to punishment.
40. See infra notes 115-19 and accompanying text (discussing how one year imprisonment is
the maximum misdemeanor sentence in most jurisdictions). By “no further criminal punishment,” I
mean no formal penal sanction—no probation, no conditions, no waiting period until the imposition
of sentence—beyond that which the defendant has already suffered. The already-suffered
punishment might include the time served in custody awaiting arraignment or other disposition of
the case. Central to the thesis of this Article is the claim that the collateral consequences of a
conviction are experienced as punishment by defendants, even if not formally categorized as such.
However here, I address only the punishment the judge is legally authorized to impose, and so
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statutory ranges, tiered misdemeanor classification schemes in most
jurisdictions, and sentencing guidelines in a handful of states, there is
little to guide that discretion. In Part IV, this Article calls for judges to
undertake “informed misdemeanor sentencing,” which draws on
principles of proportionality and parsimony in determining the just
sentence in a misdemeanor case. This means judges should recognize the
many serious collateral consequences an individual suffers after any
penal sanction, to keep punishment proportionate. It also means judges
should make more use of deferred adjudication as well as expungement
and related mechanisms for mitigating the unintended effects of a
misdemeanor conviction, in an attempt to bring parsimony into the
sentencing process.
II.

STRUCTURAL AND SYSTEMIC BARRIERS TO INFORMED
MISDEMEANOR SENTENCING41

The structural and systemic barriers to justice in the lower criminal
courts are too numerous to fully explore here. These barriers include the
vexing structural problems posed by a system that places so much power
into the hands of law enforcement and prosecutors. For example, the
effective disappearance of the misdemeanor jury trial and the use of
arrests without adjudication to mark individuals for future sanctions are
serious threats to the horizontal separation of powers envisioned as a
check on government overreach.42 However, lower criminal court judges
retain significant power at sentencing and this Part explores those
barriers most likely to impede the suggestion, in Part III, that judges take
a more informed, realistic view of the true consequences of a
misdemeanor charge to impose proportionate and parsimonious
misdemeanor sentences.
A return to (and expansion on) one of the scenarios described in the
Introduction highlights the most significant structural and systemic
barriers to the judicial exercise of informed misdemeanor sentencing. In
the scenario, a defendant facing minor theft charges decided to enter a

reference “criminal punishment.”
41. By “structural” barriers, I mean the manner in which different elements at play in the
lower criminal courts affect the way misdemeanors are adjudicated. I do not mean the types of
broad structural considerations, like federalism and separation of powers, which have also been
analyzed in the sentencing context. See Berman & Bibas, supra note 25.
42. See Rachel Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989,
1024-28, 1047-50 (2006) (noting how low number of jury trials has subverted the critical check on
the power of prosecutors and judges in criminal cases); see also Kohler-Haussman, supra note 2
(describing how deferred dismissal in misdemeanor case in New York City serves to mark person
for later, ratcheting-up of consequences upon subsequent arrest).
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guilty plea.43 His lawyer requested a sentence of probation before
judgment (“PBJ”), which would result in discharge of the case without
any judgment of conviction upon successful completion of a period of
probation and any conditions. Defense counsel supported the request by
having the defendant’s employer make a statement to the judge, about
how he considers the defendant to be one of his best workers. The
defendant also made a compelling statement about regret for his actions
and his desire to avoid a conviction that would hurt his future
employment prospects. The prosecutor, as you might remember, took no
position on sentencing (this was carefully negotiated). The judge granted
the PBJ.
Now imagine the next case, which involves the very same charges
and a similarly-situated defendant. However in this case, counsel rushes
in right as the case is called, having been pulled away to another
courtroom to represent a client there. There is a brief negotiation
between counsel and the prosecutor, and counsel then quickly explains
the offer to her client, all while the judge waits. The client accepts the
offer, which is the same bargain as the defendant in the first scenario—a
guilty plea to one count in exchange for dismissal of the other count, and
the prosecutor taking no position at sentencing. After the defendant
enters the plea, at sentencing, defense counsel reads aloud her notes
about her client’s work experience and family. She is interrupted several
times by her client, who corrects some mistakes. Counsel focuses her
request on the avoidance of jail time; she does not ask for, and the client
does not get, a PBJ.
In the third scenario (again with the same charges, judge, and
prosecutor, and a similarly situated defendant), the defendant appears
without counsel. The judge reads a note from the file indicating that the
defendant was to hire private counsel. The defendant explains that he
tried, but simply did not have the money to pay the fee for an initial
appearance in a misdemeanor case, let alone the eventual fee should the
case proceed beyond that point. The judge informs the defendant that his
case would still proceed to trial that day, and that he could speak directly
with the prosecutor should he be interested in a plea bargain. After a
short break during which the defendant speaks with the prosecutor, he
enters a guilty plea to the full set of charges, without any charge bargain.
The prosecutor requests one year of probation, and the judge asks the
defendant if he has anything he would like to say. After the defendant
looks around nervously and then shakes his head “no,” the judge
imposes a sentence of one year of supervised probation, with any drug or
43. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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alcohol treatment that the probation officer deems appropriate. There is
no discussion about a PBJ. Indeed, the defendant has no idea about the
existence of this option.
These scenarios illustrate some of the most common impediments
to the type of informed sentencing that needs to take place in more
misdemeanor cases. The crisis in the lower criminal courts—while still
too often ignored in important discussions about the criminal justice
system that tend to focus on mass incarceration44 rather than mass
criminalization—is by this point well-documented.45 A relentless law
enforcement focus on low-level arrests for the past two decades, as
violent crime continued to fall in most jurisdictions,46 means that
misdemeanors now comprise almost eighty percent of many criminal
court dockets.47 Yet misdemeanors get a disproportionately small slice
of already-stretched criminal justice system resources.48 Prosecutors may
lack the time, and sometimes the inclination, to exercise the discretion
necessary to determine which misdemeanor arrests truly merit
prosecution.49 Judges may lack the time, and sometimes the inclination,
44. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 185-86; MARC MAUER & MEDA CHESNEY-LIND,
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT (2002); see
also Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 545-45 (2011) (affirming lower court order requiring reduction
of prison population to remedy Eighth Amendment violations primarily caused by overcrowding).
45. The lower criminal courts were the subject of important scholarly and practitioner
attention in the 1970s. See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT:
HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979); William E. Hellerstein, The Importance of
the Misdemeanor Case on Trial and Appeal, 28 LEGAL AID BRIEF CASE 151, (1970). After decades
of scant examination of misdemeanors, a recent body of legal scholarship has focused again on this
critical component of the criminal justice system. See, e.g., John D. King, Beyond “Life and
Liberty”: The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2013); Kohler-Hausmann,
supra note 2; Natapoff, supra note 33; Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining
Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277 (2011).
46. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, 9, 26-27, Davis v. City of New York, 10-CIV-699 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 28, 2010) (describing how law enforcement in the Bronx, New York, made thousands of
misdemeanor trespass arrests in 2008 alone); see also HOWARD N. SNYDER, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, ARREST IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990-2010, at 1, 7 (2012) (“The number of murder
arrests in the U.S. fell by half between 1990 and 2010. The adult and juvenile arrest rates dropped
substantially in the 1990s, while both continued to fall about 20% between 2000 and 2010, reaching
their lowest levels since at least 1990.”).
47. See CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, STATEWIDE MISDEMEANOR
CASELOADS AND RATES, http://www.ncsc.org/Sitecore/Content/Microsites/PopUp/Home/CSP/
CSP_Intro (showing misdemeanor caseload rates in thirty-four reporting jurisdictions) (last visited
Nov. 15, 2017); Victor Eugene Flango, Judicial Roles for Modern Courts, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST.
COURTS, http://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/future-trends-2013/home/Monthly-Trends
-Articles/Judicial-Roles-for-Modern-Courts.aspx (“Approximately 80 percent of criminal cases are
misdemeanors . . . more than 70 percent of which are handled by municipal judges . . . .”).
48. See, e.g., Joe, supra note 20, at 750.
49. See Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome, 56
ARIZ. L. REV. 1065, 1103-04, 1108-10 (2014) (describing statistically significant difference in how
junior and entry-level prosecutors rated “good relationship with police” and “low declination rates”
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to properly adjudicate misdemeanors, instead opting to process cases
with a focus on efficiency rather than justice.50
The result is that, unless someone like defense counsel in the first
scenario slows down the process, judges may rush through the docket.
Too often, individuals facing misdemeanor charges have an attorney
unable to meet minimum Sixth Amendment standards of effective
assistance of counsel, like the rushed defense lawyer above who failed to
request a PBJ.51 Or the defendant might fall into the large gap between
qualifying for government-financed counsel and being able to afford
private counsel—like the defendant who had to negotiate his own
“bargain” and represent himself at sentencing in one of the scenarios.
Many judges are hesitant to request information they need for informed
sentencing directly from the defendant (and have sound constitutional,
statutory, or ethical constraints for that hesitancy).52
A core function of a criminal defense lawyer, particularly if the
parties agree on a sentence bargain or if there is a verdict of guilt, is to
represent the defendant at sentencing. Yet, while the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel means that the state must appoint counsel for all indigent
defendants facing felony charges,53 that right does not extend to all
misdemeanor charges. Instead, the constitutional right to misdemeanor
counsel is an ex post approach where the Sixth Amendment is violated
only when a judge imposes an actual or suspended sentence of
incarceration upon a defendant without counsel (absent a valid waiver of
the right).54 However, many states offer a more expansive state
constitutional or statutory right to counsel in misdemeanors.55
as more important measures of success than their more senior colleagues).
50. See BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 11.
51. See AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE: A REPORT ON
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S HEARINGS ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS 26 (2004).
52. For example, a judge who directly questions a defendant about his immigration status may
run afoul of Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination and may breach the
professional boundaries between the role of defense counsel and judge.
53. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963) (under the Sixth Amendment,
applicable to states through the Fourteenth Amendment, state courts must appoint counsel to
individuals who cannot afford to hire private counsel).
54. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002) (finding that Sixth Amendment bars
imposition of suspended sentence when underlying sentence followed “uncounseled conviction”);
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 371-74 (1979) (finding that an indigent defendant cannot be
sentenced to imprisonment unless he has been afforded the right to counsel); Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25, 36-38 (1972) (“[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be
imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was
represented by counsel at his trial.” (footnote omitted)).
55. See Shelton, 535 U.S. at 668-70 (“Most jurisdictions already provide a state-law right to
appointed counsel more generous than that afforded by the Federal Constitution.”).
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Even when there is a constitutional right to misdemeanor counsel, it
is a right too often honored in the breach. A 2009 report on the lower
criminal courts noted that “a significant percentage of defendants in
misdemeanor courts never receive a lawyer to represent them.”56
Another follow-up study, examining misdemeanor courts in twenty-one
Florida counties, found that 66% of defendants appeared at arraignment
without counsel and that “[a]lmost 70% of defendants observed entered
a guilty or no contest plea at arraignment.”57 The judge who sentences a
pro se defendant has a particular responsibility for ensuring that the
individual receives the same sentence he would have received had
counsel represented him. For example, the judge in scenario three,
above, was fully aware of the option of a PBJ and had an ethical and
professional duty to make the defendant aware of this option at
sentencing,58 share the types of factors relevant to a PBJ request, give
the defendant time to prepare to make a request for a PBJ should he
choose to do so, and offer the defendant the opportunity to respond to
any prosecution representations. The judge would also have to inform
the pro se defendant that a PBJ does not count as a conviction under
state law upon successful completion of probation and any conditions,
but that is does meet the definition of “conviction” under federal
immigration law.59 While avoiding direct questioning about the
defendant’s immigration status, which could run afoul of Fifth
Amendment protections, the judge would have to make it clear that any
non-citizen defendant should consider this counter-intuitive effect of a
PBJ under federal immigration law.

56. See BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 7 at 14.
57. ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDAN, THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN
FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 15 (2011).
58. This is not as simple as it might sound. For example, in Maryland a defendant who
accepts a PBJ in District Court (the general misdemeanor court) must waive his right to a de novo
appeal in Circuit Court—which is where he can have a jury trial in most instances—because the
District Court case will remain open for fulfillment of probation and any conditions well beyond the
30-day statutory deadline for filing an appeal. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 6-220(e)(1)
(LexisNexis 2017) (“By consenting to and receiving a stay of entering of the judgment as provided
by subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the defendant waives the right to appeal at any time from
the judgment of guilt.”). The judge would thus have to explain this to the defendant. Not a difficult
task, but somewhat more complex than explaining only the PBJ.
59. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2012) (defining “conviction” to include circumstances
where an “adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where . . . the alien . . . admitted sufficient facts
to warrant a finding of guilt, and . . . the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or
restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed”); State v. Kona, 71 N.E.3d 1023, 1024-26 (Ohio 2016)
(describing how defendant faced deportation based on out-of-court, written admission of guilt that
was required for entry into a pre-trial diversion program).
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Of course, such aspirations are unlikely to be met in jurisdictions
that blatantly and consciously ignore the right to misdemeanor counsel.
Infamously (at least in misdemeanor circles), the South Carolina
Supreme Court Chief Justice stated, at that state’s public bar association
meeting, that she instructs lower court judges to ignore the federal
constitutional right to counsel in misdemeanor cases. In her view,
Alabama v. Shelton is one of the more misguided decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, I must say. If we adhered to it in South
Carolina we would have the right to counsel probably . . . by
dragooning lawyers out of their law offices to take these cases in every
magistrate’s court in South Carolina, and I have simply told my
magistrates that we just don’t have the resources to do that. So I will
tell you straight up that we [are] not adhering to Alabama v. Shelton in
every situation.60

This outrageous but honest statement raises another impediment to
informed misdemeanor sentencing, namely the tendency to favor speed
over justice. In 1972, the Supreme Court cautioned how “the volume of
misdemeanor cases, far greater in number than felony prosecutions, may
create an obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of the fairness of
the result.”61 Since the Court offered that assessment, the annual volume
of misdemeanors nationwide has more than doubled.62 At the same time,
the ratio of state court judges per U.S. resident and per arrest has
declined.63 The obsession over speedy disposition has arrived as
predicted, with enormous pressure on judges to move dockets in order to
make room for the new cases that continue to pour into the lower courts.
The attempt to “balance efficiency against procedural fairness” has been
aptly described as one of “modern sentencing systems[’] chief covert
practical concern[s].”64
While efficiency in the face of resource constraints is a factor at all
stages of a case, sentencing remains a core function of the misdemeanor
judge and careful, informed sentencing should not be subservient to the
real or perceived need to move quickly. It is also important to keep in
60.
61.
62.
63.

BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 14.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34-35 (1972) (footnote omitted).
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
RON MALEGA & THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE COURT
ORGANIZATION, 2011, at 1 & fig.1 (2013) (“From 1980 to 2011, . . . [b]ecause of . . . increases [in
the U.S. resident population and in arrests], the ratio of judges per 100,000 U.S. residents declined
23%, from 13.2 in 1980 to 10.2 in 2011.”).
64. Berman & Bibas, supra note 25, at 43. While the authors were not discussing lower
criminal courts, this covert concern is even more pernicious with misdemeanors, because a drive for
efficiency combined with volume and resource constraints can lead to a near-total lack of process.
See Natapoff, supra note 33, at 1328-29.
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mind that legislative, law enforcement, and prosecutorial choices created
the exponential rise in misdemeanor prosecutions—a rise that is not
empirically justified from a public safety perspective.65 Further, although
often attributed to the need to move a high volume of misdemeanor
cases through a system lacking resources to handle that volume, the
culture of expediency exists in lower criminal courts that do not handle
the type of high-volume dockets characteristic of a busy, urban
courthouse. This is surely due in part to limited resources even in lowervolume jurisdictions.66 It is also likely due in part to a misguided belief
that the consequences of a misdemeanor are slight. All parties, including
defense counsel, suffer from a lagging understanding of the true
meaning of a criminal record in the electronic age, where records are
bought, sold, and constantly and easily consulted in the housing and
employment markets.67
The pressure on judges to move dockets can come not only from
real or perceived necessity, but also from the related phenomenon of
some judges’ belief that they must quickly “dispose of”68 cases so they
can move up and out of the lower criminal court. While there are a
variety of ways in different jurisdictions that an appointed or elected
judge might advance to a court of general jurisdiction (where felonies
are adjudicated), it is almost universally viewed as desirable to move out
of misdemeanor court.69 Related to the push to keep dockets moving in
order to move up and out of misdemeanor court is the issue of judges
who believe—whether correctly or not—that they must avoid making
waves while in lower criminal court if they want that opportunity to
advance.70 Even well intentioned judges can be affected by the desire to
65. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control:
The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173, 176, 186-87,
202-06 (2008) (discussing how changes in social and economic structure may explain how “higher
incarceration rates resulted in stable if not higher levels of crime”); see also BERNARD E.
HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 6-7, 59-89
(2001) (scrutinizing the evidence and policy behind the “broken windows” theory).
66. MALEGA & COHEN, supra note 63, at 2 (“Many [lower jurisdiction courts] are funded and
operated at the local level (e.g., county) . . . .”).
67. See Alessandro Corda, More Justice and Less Harm: Reinventing Access to Criminal
History Records, 60 HOW. L.J. 1, 15-19, 37-40 (2016).
68. This is a common, unfortunate, yet fairly accurate, term for the way misdemeanor cases
are adjudicated in many lower criminal courts.
69. See Ethan J. Leib, Local Judges and Local Government, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 707, 727-28 (2015) (“[S]ome judges might pay more attention to judges higher in the judicial
bureaucratic organization chart because they are inclined to use the local-judge job to move up the
judicial hierarchy and are therefore more conscious of it.”); id. at 728 n.128 (describing interview
with lower court judge who stated that “[i]t is common to try to move up to county or Supreme”).
70. Jessica A. Roth, The Culture of Misdemeanor Courts, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 215, 230-31
(2017).
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move to a felony docket, in the belief that they can do more good in a
court where (in their view) the cases matter more.
Related to the likely desire to move up and out of misdemeanor
court is the fact that lower court judges are likely to be the least
experienced, on their potentially first assignment to a courtroom. Most
states have a limited jurisdiction court, also known as a lower court,
where judges handle a variety of lesser criminal and civil matters. While
these judges, in some jurisdictions, handle the initial stages of a felony
case (arraignment, preliminary hearing), the bulk of their criminal
docket will be misdemeanors.71 This new-to-the-job-of-judging reality
could cut both ways in terms of the ability to pursue proper sentencing
procedures. On the one hand, “beginner” judges might lack the
perspective to keep misdemeanor punishment in context and
proportionate, and the confidence to slow down to make more fully
informed sentencing decisions. On the other hand, these judges might
temper their use of harsher punishments since, unlike judges handling
felony cases, imposing a year in jail would be the upper legislative
limit.72 In an added twist, only 59% of judges nationwide in limited
jurisdiction courts “were required to obtain some type [of] legal
qualification to serve as a judge,” and “[p]ossessing a law degree was
the most commonly required legal qualification.”73 This means that in
some jurisdictions, judges handling misdemeanor cases may not even
be lawyers.74
Close consideration of the role of the judge in misdemeanor
sentencing is even more important in light of the reality that these
sentences are rarely subject to appellate review.75 Such review is
71. MALEGA & COHEN, supra note 63, at 2-3 (“In 2011, 46 states used general jurisdiction
courts (GJCs) and limited jurisdiction courts (LJCs).”); id. at 2 (describing types of cases
adjudicated in limited jurisdiction courts).
72. In my own experience, experienced judges who handle serious felony cases are more
likely to view minor misdemeanor cases in perspective, and less likely to exercise their discretion to
the limits of the sentencing law. Cf. Joe, supra note 20 (suggesting that more experienced defense
attorneys are better equipped to handle misdemeanor cases); Wright & Levine, supra note 49
(discussing how new prosecutors tend to be more adversarial, and less balanced, in their approach to
handling cases).
73. MALEGA & COHEN, supra note 63, at 5; see also Leib, supra note 69, at 715 n.32 (“New
York, along with the majority of American states, allows non-attorney justices to preside in courts
of limited jurisdiction.”).
74. See William Glaberson, Delivering Small-Town Justice, with a Mix of Trial and
Error, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006, at A1, B2; William Glaberson, How a Reviled Court System Has
Outlasted Many Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2006, at A1; William Glaberson, In Tiny Courts of
N.Y., Abuses of Law and Power, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2006, at A1; see also SPECIAL COMM’N ON
THE FUTURE OF N.Y. STATE COURTS, JUSTICE MOST LOCAL: THE FUTURE OF TOWN AND VILLAGE
COURTS IN NEW YORK STATE (2008) (discussing the use of non-attorney judges in New York).
75. See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
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intended to correct sentencing errors in felony cases, and plays a
significant role in shaping sentencing policy and practice.76 Numerous
reasons exist for this lack of review in misdemeanor cases, including that
so many defendants facing misdemeanor charges are denied counsel and
that judges handling pro se guilty pleas might neglect to inform the
defendant of the right to appeal, with the limited window of time
(typically, thirty days) for filing that appeal.77 Defendants who plead
guilty to a misdemeanor may do so in exchange for or anticipation of
little to no jail time, reducing their immediate incentive to appeal the
case. Even if they receive a jail sentence, they are likely to have finished
it by the time any appeal would be heard let alone decided, further
reducing that incentive. Although many individuals later come to learn
that their seemingly minor misdemeanor conviction is actually a
significant barrier to essentials of daily life such as securing housing or
employment,78 by that point the time to file a direct appeal has long
expired. Further, while there are some limited avenues for seeking postconviction review in misdemeanor cases, there are significant procedural
barriers to that review, such as the requirement in the federal habeas
statute and many state habeas statutes that an individual be “in custody”
to seek review.79
In general, inadequate attention has been paid to the institutional
dynamics of lower courts adjudicating misdemeanor cases.80 Those
dynamics, in the form of the systemic and structural realities described
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 701-06 (2007); see also Roberts, supra
note 45, at 337-40.
76. See Berman & Bibas, supra note 25, at 41, 43 (discussing how appellate review is an
important facet shaping felony sentencing law, policy, and practice); id. at 64-65 (noting that
appellate review of sentencing decisions varies by jurisdiction, ranging from searching to nonexistent).
77. SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 57, at 19 (describing, in observational study in twenty-one
Florida counties, how only 23.7% of defendants were advised of the right to appeal after sentencing
at arraignment and how that number was even lower for in-custody defendants, despite a Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure requiring trial judges to inform defendants of their right to appeal).
78. Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find
Consequences Can Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2014, 10:30 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-arrest-records-rise-americans-find-consequences-can-last-a-lifetime1408415402; see also LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra note 3, at ch. 2, (detailing myriad types
of collateral consequences); National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Conviction,
COUNSEL OF STATE GOV’TS, https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org (last visited Nov. 15, 2017) (allowing
users to search for various collateral consequences using fields such as jurisdiction and type of
consequence in database cataloguing consequences in state and federal laws and regulations).
79. See Roberts, supra note 45, at 338-40.
80. See Leib, supra note 69, at 715-23, 726-38 (calling attention to this inadequacy). But cf.
Jennifer A. Scarduzio, Managing Order Through Deviance? The Emotional Deviance, Power, and
Professional Work of Municipal Court Judges, 25 MGMT. COMM. Q. 283 (2011) (examining the
interactions of municipal court judges).
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above as well as other factors, play a role in the way a judge will
exercise discretion when imposing sentences in misdemeanor cases.
III.

PURPOSES OF PUNISHMENT AND THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
IN MISDEMEANOR SENTENCING

The history of misdemeanor sentencing is firmly rooted in judicial
discretion.81 Before the nineteenth century, judges had little discretion in
felony sentencing,82 but the common law of misdemeanor sentencing
allowed judges to impose an unlimited amount of imprisonment.83 Still,
judges more commonly imposed fines or whipping since “the idea of
prison as a punishment would have seemed an absurd expense.”84
Misdemeanor sentences were subject to “the limitations that the
punishment not ‘touch life or limb,’ that it be proportionate to the
offense, and, by the 17th century, that it not be ‘cruel or unusual,’”85 but
otherwise offered judges much more flexibility than felony sentencing.
Modern misdemeanor sentencing also offers judges broad
discretion, although most jurisdictions allow a maximum sentence of one
year of imprisonment for a misdemeanor conviction.86 The ways in
which judges might exercise that discretion is thus critical to an
examination of sentencing in the lower criminal courts. To set the stage
for that examination, this Part first explores the purposes and functions
of misdemeanor punishment before turning to judicial discretion in
misdemeanor sentencing.
A. Purposes and Functions of Misdemeanor Punishment
The underlying theories of punishment in the United States have
shifted several times in the last century. Although no one theory has ever
81. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 480 n.7 (2000) (noting how “[t]he common law of
punishment for misdemeanors—those ‘smaller faults, and omissions of less consequence,’—was
substantially more dependent upon judicial discretion” than for felonies (citation omitted)).
82. See Berman & Bibas, supra note 25, at 60-61 (“With the development of penitentiaries
and the embrace of rehabilitation, American sentencing lurched from all law and no discretion to no
law and all discretion.”).
83. Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty
Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1125-26 (2001); see also id. at 1125 n.206 (noting how at common law,
“[i]n theory, judges could order unlimited imprisonment [for a misdemeanor], though in practice
they appear not to have imposed sentences of longer than five years” (citing 1 JAMES FITZJAMES
STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 490 (London, MacMillan 1883))).
84. Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 480 n.7 (quoting J.H. Baker, Criminal Courts and Procedure at
Common Law 1550-1800, in CRIME IN ENGLAND 1550-1800, at 15, 43 (J.S. Cockburn ed., 1977));
see also id. (“Actual sentences of imprisonment for [misdemeanor] offenses, however, were rare at
common law until the late 18th century.”).
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.15(1) (McKinney 2009).
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fully accounted for punishment approaches at any given time,
punishment in the United States has moved from a utilitarian approach,
which focused on rehabilitation from the early twentieth century through
the 1970s, to a more retributive approach that included mandatory
guidelines, mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, harsh sentences,
and three-strikes laws in the last decades of the twentieth century.87
More recently, things have lurched back towards what might be
characterized as more rehabilitative, or at least more utilitarian in
recognizing that the harsh policies of the last quarter of the twentieth
century have failed in many respects.88
Threaded through these approaches, and significant to any theory of
sentencing, is the principle of proportionality. Under this principle, any
punishment imposed must fit the crime, to be proportionate to the
seriousness of the crime committed.89 In addition to being proportionate,
sentences should follow the parsimony principle, under which “states
should not inflict any more punishment than is necessary.”90
Proportionality and parsimony are particularly relevant to misdemeanor
sentencing in a world where the true effects of the conviction last far
longer than any direct penal sanction.

87. See Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, in 34 CRIME & JUSTICE: A
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, at 16-18 (2006) [hereinafter Tonry, Purposes and Functions]. But cf.
Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975-2025, in 42 CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA, 19752025, at 141, 171-73 (Michael Tonry ed., 2013) (“By the mid-1980s the tough on crime period was
under way. Except in lip service, proportionality largely disappeared as a policy goal.”) [hereinafter
Tonry, Sentencing in America]. See also Carissa Byrne Hessick & Douglas A. Berman, Towards a
Theory of Mitigation, 96 B.U. L. REV. 161, 163, 167-77 (2016) (describing how structured
sentencing replaced a rehabilitative approach after the 1970s, but noting how even today, “no single
theory of punishment has replaced the discredited theory of rehabilitation”). Although “[f]or most of
the twentieth century, the predominant focus of sentencing was the consideration of offenders’
rehabilitative potential,” other utilitarian concerns at that time included deterrence (specific and
general), and incapacitation. Id. at 162, 183-85.
88. See Tonry, Sentencing in America, supra note 87, at 144-45, 150-51 (describing the most
recent period of sentencing in the United States, from 1996 to the present, as difficult to characterize
under existing theories of punishment).
89. Id. at 145 (“There are many slightly different retributivist theories of punishment, but all
have at their core the idea that criminal punishments, to be just, must in some meaningful way be
proportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s crime.”). Alice Ristroph de-links proportionality
from punishment theory to offer a more robust understanding of the concept and to move away from
the claim that proportionality is limited by institutional competence (and thus calls for deference to
legislative decisions about sentencing). Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited
Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263, 266 (2005) (characterizing “proportionality review [a]s an attempt
to specify the outer limits of the penal power—not an attempt to direct the legislature’s choices
within the boundaries of that power”).
90. Hessick & Berman, supra note 87, at 165; see Douglas A. Berman, Reconceptualizing
Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 49 (stating that the parsimony principle “calls for the
imposition of the least punitive or burdensome punishment that will achieve valid social purposes”).
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Also significant to any misdemeanor theory of punishment is the
more critical lens that considers criminal law and punishment as a form
of social control—one that takes particular aim at the lives of the poor
and of people and communities of color. For example, Michelle
Alexander has characterized the criminal justice system in recent
decades, in particular the War on Drugs, as a system of racial control
similar to Jim Crow laws mandating racial segregation from the late
1870s through the mid-1960s.91 At a more general level, discussing what
he termed “anormative” theories of justice, Michael Tonry described the
“tough on crime” period in the United States as
characterized by [a] political culture[] in which the interests of some
people do or did not count. . . . [S]ocial categories of people are the
targets of laws, policies, and patterns of punishment that suggest that
they are seen primarily as social threats and not as people whose
interests deserve the concern and respect that traditional retributive and
consequentialist theories of punishment would give them. 92

In current debates about sentencing, unusual coalitions have formed
to support a less punitive and expensive, and more fair and effective
criminal justice system.93 Still, commentators have noted the lack of any
coherent theory of current sentencing policy, calling it a “muddle,”94 and
noting “a compelling need for a new sentencing model.”95 These
theories, shifts, and debates have focused almost exclusively on
punishment in felony cases.
It is not that scholars, politicians, and others purposely ignore
misdemeanor punishment, but rather that discussions about the purposes
and functions of punishment usually draw from examples or situations
involving high-level, sometimes violent crimes. Offenses like murder,
rape, and—more recently—felony drug sale and possession have
91. ALEXANDER, supra note 6; see also Fagan & Meares, supra note 65, at 180.
92. Tonry, Sentencing in America, supra note 87, at 174.
93. See Rachel Barkow, The Criminal Regulatory State, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE
THINKING 33, 46 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017); Eric H. Holder, Jr., We Can
Have Shorter Sentences and Less Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2016, at 6 (referring to “a rare
bipartisan consensus [including senior law enforcement officials] in favor of changing drugsentencing laws . . . to improve the fairness and efficiency of America’s criminal justice system”);
EJ Hurst II, Federal Sentencing and Prison Reform Now Bipartisan Issues, THE HILL (Aug. 13,
2014, 7:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/punditsblog/crime/214998-federal-sentencing-and-prisonreform-now-bipartisan-issues.
94. Tonry, Purposes and Functions, supra note 87, at 1-4 (noting, however, that “[m]uddles
are not necessarily bad”); cf. id. at 8 (“The primary functions of sentencing, most people would
agree, are imposition of appropriate punishments and prevention of crime.”).
95. RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A WORKABLE
SYSTEM, at xii (2013) (“[N]o new sentencing model has emerged to replace the formerly monolithic
dominance of indeterminate sentencing . . . .”).
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dominated punishment literature and policy discussions. Although the
current state of sentencing theory and policy may be in flux, there is
agreement that punishment must be both morally legitimate and serve
some articulated purpose.96 In many felony cases, there might be
disagreement over the type and length of sentence, but in general it is
possible to articulate a purpose for sentencing someone for an armed
robbery, sexual assault, or drug sale.97
Misdemeanor sentencing is not simply a mini version of felony
sentencing. Although some more serious misdemeanors (e.g., assault,
driving while intoxicated) might fit into a theoretical and practical
framework developed in the felony punishment context, many
misdemeanors are truly minor offenses. In some jurisdictions, a
combination of charges like possession of an open container of alcohol,
disturbing the peace, disorderly conduct, driving with a license
suspended for failure to pay parking tickets, trespassing on posted public
property, or unlicensed vending can make up a significant portion of the
lower court docket.98 The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting publication,
Crime in the United States, reported 10.8 million total estimated arrests
in the United States in 2015, more than one million of which were in the
categories of “liquor laws,” “drunkenness,” “disorderly conduct,” and
“vagrancy.”99 These numbers are certainly under-inclusive, and do not
include other potentially minor misdemeanor charges that could fall into
the FBI categories.100 For example, there are almost a quarter of a
96. See John B. Mitchell, Crimes of Misery and Theories of Punishment, 15 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 465, 475-76 (2012) (noting that the definition of “crime” includes both prohibited conduct and
a prescribed penalty, interpreting that penalty to mean “legitimate penalty,” and stating that such
legitimacy means that the punishment must be “justified by condemnation (retribution) or general or
specific deterrence” and must “fulfill any of the five traditional purposes of punishment”).
97. Again, there may be disagreement over whether using the criminal justice system is the
right approach to drug addiction, but it is at least defensible to say that drug possession causes social
harm and thus merits imprisonment or that drug users can be rehabilitated.
98. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to
Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1666 (2010) (noting that “[m]any of the cases in the [lower]
courts (perhaps the majority in most urban jurisdictions) are petty public order cases”); see also
BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 26 (“[D]riving with a suspended license charges make up a
significant part of the caseload in many jurisdictions . . . [often] result[ing] from failure to pay fines
or fees such as tickets for a broken tail light . . . parking tickets, or even failure to pay child
support.”); GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF CRIME CONTROL & PREVENTION, THIRD REPORT TO THE
STATE OF MARYLAND UNDER CHAPTERS 504 AND 505 OF 512: 2015 CRIMINAL CITATIONS DATA
ANALYSIS 2 & n.1 (2016) (noting that 39,636 criminal citations issued in Maryland in calendar year
2013 were for minor offenses).
99. FBI, Crime in the United States: Table 29, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/
crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-29 (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
100. Press Release, FBI National Press Office, FBI Releases 2015 Crime Statistics (Sept. 26,
2016) (“Of the 18,439 city, county, university and college, state, tribal, and federal agencies eligible
to participate in the [FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting] Program, [only] 16,643 submitted data in
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million arrests in the categories of “prostitution and commercialized
vice” and “vandalism,”101 which are likely composed largely of
misdemeanors. In addition, almost 1.2 million of the total arrests are in
the “larceny-theft” category.102 More than 22% of “larceny-thefts” are
shoplifting,103 many of which are likely misdemeanors. Further, of the
1.48 million reported “drug abuse violation” arrests in 2015, almost onethird were for marijuana possession.104
For the very low-level, often mala prohibita, offenses,105 it is
difficult to conceptualize sentencing as retributivist, or as fulfilling the
need for incapacitation or even rehabilitation.106 For example, imposing
a deserved punishment or attempting to rehabilitate the offender is a
tough philosophical fit when applied to someone convicted of driving to
a new job on a license suspended for failure to pay parking tickets due to
an inability to pay, or to someone convicted of enjoying a beer on the
front steps of his apartment building. Even for offenses that might be
categorized as “mid-level” misdemeanors, such as drug possession or
shoplifting, the felony model is a poor fit when it comes to the purposes
and functions of sentencing.107

2015.”). The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (“UCR”) does not include traffic violations, which
can comprise a significant portion of some local criminal court dockets. See id.; see also
BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 26. Finally, it is worth noting that the UCR only receives
arrest data for Part II offenses, and most misdemeanors fall into Part II. See FBI, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2011, at 1-5 (2012).
101. Crime in the United States: Table 29, FBI, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/
crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-29 (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
102. Id. (listing larceny-theft as its own category separate from motor vehicle theft, fraud,
embezzlement, forgery, and stolen property).
103. Larceny-theft Table, FBI, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/
tables/larceny-theft_table-larceny-theft_percent_distribution_within_region_2015.xls (last visited
Nov. 15, 2017).
104. Crime in the United States: Persons Arrested 2013, FBI, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-theu.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/persons-arrested/persons-arrested (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
105. 21 AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law 25 (2017) (defining mala prohibita crimes as “acts which
would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them”).
106. See Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 67, 70-71 & n.55
(1933) (contrasting “true crimes of the classic law” against the “new type of twentieth century
regulatory measure involving no moral delinquency”).
107. See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 2, at 615 (“Existing models of criminal law, which
have been built up almost entirely around felony adjudication, simply do not fit lower criminal
courts. The social imperative to punish and the incentive to litigate diverge dramatically from felony
to misdemeanor cases. Lower criminal courts process cases where the alleged crimes do not, by and
large, represent an affront to widely held moral sentiments or cry out for the social act of
punishment.”); see also Tonry, Purposes and Functions, supra note 87, at 32 (stating that “[w]e are
pretty good at predicting petty reoffending” but asking: “Is it worth $40,000-$50,000 per year to
prevent shoplifting, minor thefts, acts of prostitution, or low-level drug dealing? It also raises the
moral question whether the disproportionate character of a multiyear prison sentence for a person
convicted of such crimes can be justified”).
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This Article does not offer a full account of the philosophical
justifications or purposes and functions of misdemeanor sentencing.
Indeed, even outside the misdemeanor context, where the bulk of
theorizing happens, commentators have noted that “[s]entencing policy
in the United States has fragmented. There is no overriding theory or
model.”108 Still, it is important to shed more light on the under-examined
yet fundamental question of what the criminal justice system is trying to
accomplish with misdemeanor sentencing, and whether and how those
goals are justified.109 Understanding the goals and purposes of
misdemeanor punishment is critical to determining which factors should
be used in the current discretionary misdemeanor sentencing regime. As
Part III explores, even a basic recognition of the need for proportionality
and parsimony in misdemeanor sentencing supports the more practical
claim that judges must take a broader, more informed view of the full
panoply of consequences that flow from a misdemeanor conviction
when determining an appropriate sentence.
It is also useful to consider whether different underlying theories of
misdemeanor sentencing may apply for different categories of offenses.
John Mitchell has described truly low-level quality of life crimes—such
as the offense of begging or sleeping in a public place—as “crimes of
misery,” and has aptly observed that “the current application of the
crimes of misery cannot be justified under any accepted philosophical
theory of punishment.”110 For this class of misdemeanors, there may be
no need to develop a theory of punishment, as punishment is morally
unjustified and these should not be unlawful acts in the first place. Other
misdemeanors might be divided into levels of seriousness (from a social
harm perspective), with a more rehabilitative focus for the lower levels
and perhaps some mix of other justifications for “true crime”
misdemeanors at the higher level.111
The newly-approved Model Penal Code: Sentencing (“MPC”)
suggests two levels of classification, “Misdemeanors” and “Petty
Misdemeanors.”112 The MPC Commentary notes how “local
sensibilities” might support finer gradations than two or even three
categories, keeping in mind that too many levels of offense may make
108. Mitchell, supra note 96, at 471.
109. See id. at 465 (“Although there is a rich and extensive literature exploring the
philosophical justification for the use of the criminal sanction, little has been concerned with minor
crimes (misdemeanors), and none of the literature concerns . . . misdemeanor public order laws.”).
110. Id. at 471, 475 (noting how if there is no legitimate basis for punishment, which along
with proscribed conduct makes up the two parts of what defines a crime, then there is no legitimate
crime).
111. See Sayre, supra note 106, at 67.
112. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.01(4) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017).
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“sensible classification of crimes, in the abstract and in relation to one
another, . . . difficult or impossible.”113 For felony classification, the new
MPC suggests five or more categories, noting how “any number of
felony grades from three to 10 would be reasonable according to current
state practice.”114
While there is not a bright theoretical line dividing felonies from
misdemeanors, the potential stratification of misdemeanors for
determining the proper approach to sentencing is relevant not only to
underlying justifications, but also to the exercise of judicial discretion.
B. Judicial Discretion in Misdemeanor Sentencing
As noted above, misdemeanor sentencing has deep, common-law
roots in judicial discretion.115 This is in contrast to felony sentencing,
which historically allowed little judicial discretion but in the last century
has fluctuated between broader and more restrictive discretionary
approaches.116 Most contemporary felony sentencing systems
incorporate both mandatory and discretionary elements.117 The
discretionary part of felony sentencing is guided by a number of factors,
including statutory ranges or fixed periods of punishment for particular
offenses, differing levels of punishment for different classifications of
offense (e.g., A felony v. B felony), and sentencing guidelines in some
jurisdictions. Local culture and custom will also affect the exercise of
sentencing discretion. Most of these factors offer more guidance for
judicial discretion in felony than in misdemeanor sentencing. Judicial
discretion at sentencing has been through cycles of critique and praise,
focusing on racial, gender, and other biases on the one hand or the need
for flexibility on the other.118 Many of these pros and cons of discretion
at sentencing apply equally to misdemeanors.

113. Id. § 6.01 cmt. a; see also id. § 6.01 cmt. d (“While there is no precise, optimum number
of misdemeanor classifications, the low level of offense seriousness within this category suggests
that a small number of statutory distinctions will be needed.”).
114. Id. § 6.01 cmt. c.
115. See supra notes 77-104 and accompanying text.
116. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 30, at 190-94 (describing broad judicial discretion at
sentencing from the late nineteenth through the mid-twentieth centuries); id. at 188 (“No sentencing
system in effect today is completely mandatory or completely discretionary; instead, they are hybrid
mandatory and discretionary schemes.” (footnote omitted)); see also Tonry, Sentencing in America,
supra note 87, at 171 (noting how, at the time the Model Penal Code was first drafted in 1962,
“[t]he only important question was whether the defendant was guilty. Once that was determined, the
judge was given broad discretion to decide what sentence to impose”).
117. Id. at 195.
118. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1949-50, 1953 (1988).
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For almost all criminal offenses, the legislature sets either a fixed
amount or a range of permissible punishment by statute.119 Only
seventeen states and the District of Columbia have largely determinate
statutory sentence lengths, although even within such fixed systems the
judge may have some discretion at sentencing.120 In indeterminate
sentencing jurisdictions, the statutory ranges for felony offenses are
much broader than the ranges for misdemeanor offenses. For example, a
felony manslaughter sentence may range from zero to ten years
imprisonment and a felony drug sale sentence may range from zero to
life,121 while the misdemeanor range in almost all jurisdictions is only
from zero to one year of imprisonment.122 In general, the range for a
term of probation will also be wider in felonies than in misdemeanors.123
These shorter ranges of misdemeanor punishment offer the most
meaningful guidance for discretionary misdemeanor sentencing—simply
by setting relatively low maximum penalties.
Another way to guide discretion in misdemeanor cases is by
classification of various offenses, with lower maximum terms set for
lower-level misdemeanors.124 For example, Alabama allows judges to
impose up to one year imprisonment for a Class A misdemeanor, up to
six months for a Class B misdemeanor, and up to three months for a
Class C misdemeanor.125 Disorderly Conduct is a Class C misdemeanor,
whereas Unlawful Possession of Marihuana in the Second Degree,

119. The rare exception is the common law crime that has not been codified. See, e.g., Howard
v. State, 156 A.3d 981, 1010 (Md. 2017) (“In the absence of a statutory penalty, the punishment for
any common law crime . . . is anything in the discretion of the sentencing judge, provided only that
it not be cruel or unusual.”); Hickman v. State, 996 A.2d 974, 980 (Md. 2010) (“Unlike other states,
which have codified the common law offense of affray, Maryland has not and, therefore, if the
offense exists, it is clearly only as a matter of common law.”).
120. See ALISON LAWRENCE, MAKING SENSE OF SENTENCING: STATE SYSTEMS AND POLICIES
4-5 (2015) (noting how, even within determinate systems, structured components such as sentencing
guidelines may guide discretion).
121. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-207(a) (LexisNexis 2017) (listing penalty
range for manslaughter); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-105(1) (LexisNexis 2017) (listing felony
sentences for various offense classifications); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-416(7)–(10) (LexisNexis
2017) (listing various potential felony classifications for sale of controlled substance).
122. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.06 cmt. l at 165 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft
2017) (“Only a handful of states currently authorize penalties in excess of one year of incarceration
for the most serious of misdemeanor offenses.”).
123. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.00(3) (McKinney 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 973.09(2)
(West 2017).
124. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.01, cmt. d at 37 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017)
(“[M]ost states with comprehensive grading schemes have adopted two or three tiers of
misdemeanor crimes.”); see id. at § 6.01 reporter’s note at 37-38.
125. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-7(a) (2017). Alabama also has “violations,” which are non-criminal
offenses, punishable by up to 30 days in county jail. Id. § 13A-5-7(b).
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involving possession for personal use only, is a Class A misdemeanor.126
Whatever one thinks of this legislative choice of the outer limits of
punishment for the particular offenses, the Alabama legislature has
chosen to limit a judge’s discretion to impose punishment in different
ways for different misdemeanors. Ohio is unusual in using four tiers of
misdemeanors, with the lowest level carrying a penalty of no more than
thirty days imprisonment127 and encompassing such offenses as Hazing
and Misconduct Involving a Public Transportation System.128
With respect to sentencing guidelines, the Apprendi-Blakely-Booker
line of cases, which rendered the federal and some state sentencing
guidelines advisory rather than mandatory, has returned some measure
of discretion to sentencing in felony cases.129 However, that discretion is
still cabined by the very existence of detailed guidelines in some states
and, at least in federal courts, by the presumptive reasonableness of a
sentence that follows the guidelines.130 Very few states have sentencing
guidelines that apply to misdemeanor offenses. Richard Frase has
identified four states where guidelines regulate misdemeanor offenses
and two more that regulate “some” misdemeanor offenses.131 Even this
limited list of misdemeanor sentencing guidelines may overstate the
situation in practice. For example, Frase lists Maryland as a
misdemeanor guideline jurisdiction. However, Maryland’s sentencing
guidelines only apply in Circuit Court,132 and Maryland misdemeanors
are usually adjudicated in District Court, with a de novo right to appeal
or a right to demand a jury trial in Circuit Court.133 Since the rate of
126. Id. § 13A-11-7(b) (“Disorderly conduct”); id. § 13A-12-214(b) (“possession of
marihuana”).
127. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.24(A) (West 2011) (allowing up to one hundred and eighty
days imprisonment for the highest level of misdemeanor, up to ninety days for the next level, up to
sixty days for the next, and up to thirty days for the lowest).
128. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.31, 2917.41 (West 2017).
129. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
(2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
130. See, e.g., Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347-51 (2007). Of course not all states have
sentencing guidelines and a 2008 National Center for State Courts’ publication noted how,
“[s]urprisingly, it is not always clear whether a particular state’s guideline system is still
operational.” NEAL B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PROFILES AND CONTINUUM 4 (2008). Still, that publication identified
twenty-one states with sentencing guidelines systems. Id. at 7-27.
131. FRASE, supra note 95, at 124 tbl.3.1 (listing states with misdemeanor sentencing
guidelines as of May 2012).
132. Sentencing Guidelines Overview, MD. STATE COMM’N ON CRIMINAL SENT’G POL’Y,
http://msccsp.org/guidelines/Overview.aspx (stating that Maryland guidelines are “for use in circuit
courts only”) (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
133. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 4-301–302 (LexisNexis 2017) (conferring
exclusive jurisdiction over misdemeanors to District Court with limited exceptions, including a de
novo appeal from a final judgment of conviction in District Court).
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misdemeanor de novo appeals and jury demands is low, the practical
reality is that sentencing guidelines are not used in most misdemeanor
sentencing in Maryland.134
Even in states with misdemeanor guidelines, there is much less
detail than in felony guidelines. For example, North Carolina has four
classes of misdemeanor offenses. Despite this larger-than-usual number
of misdemeanor classifications, North Carolina’s misdemeanor guideline
matrix has only thirteen boxes, using the category of class of offense
along one side of the matrix and prior conviction level along the other.
Within all of the thirteen boxes in the matrix, judges retain the discretion
to impose a “community punishment,” which means no jail time. In four
of the boxes, judges can only impose community punishment.135 Even in
the upper right corner of the North Carolina grid, which is for the highest
offense classification and the highest number of prior convictions,
judges are limited to imposing a maximum of 150 days imprisonment.136
The result is that judges have a wide range of discretion with a limited
upper range, at least when it comes to imprisonment.137
One likely reason for the exclusion of misdemeanors from most
sentencing guidelines is that the commissions charged with creating and
updating guidelines are state agencies, attuned to issues with statewide
impact, such as the resources of the state prison system. Misdemeanor
cases, by contrast, more often involve county or other local resources.138
While this may allow “county jurisdictions greater freedom to consider
local resources and set a local sentencing standard,”139 it is also worth
noting that the exclusion of misdemeanors from most sentencing
134. MD. JUDICIARY, COURT OPERATIONS DEP’T, ANNUAL STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: FISCAL
YEAR 2015, at tbls.CC-1.2 & DC-4 (listing 188,538 non-motor vehicle criminal cases terminated in
district court in 2015, with 27,789 de novo appeals or jury demands terminated in circuit court that
same year).
135. N.C.G.A. § 15A-1340.23 (2013); see also N.C. SENTENCING & POLICY ADVISORY
COMM’N, STRUCTURED SENTENCING: TRAINING AND REFERENCE MANUAL 51 fig.C (2014).
136. Id.
137. It is important to recognize that probation can be quite onerous for a misdemeanor
conviction, and can endure far longer than any maximum jail term. Alexandra Natapoff,
Misdemeanors, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 255, 261-62 (2015) (“Probation is typically cast as a
lenient alternative to incarceration. But it is punitive in its own unique ways. Probation terms are
typically much longer—six months to two years—than misdemeanor incarceration terms. While on
probation, offenders are subject to myriad intrusive conditions, including drug testing, employment
requirements, travel restrictions, and loss of privacy.”).
138. See JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURED SENTENCING 65
(1996); see also Leib, supra note 69, at 707.
139. Id. at 65 (noting how such an outcome would “threaten[] the integrity of the guideline’s
attempt to achieve fairness and proportionality”); cf. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05 (McKinney 2009)
(listing general purposes of New York State’s Penal Code, including the need “[t]o differentiate on
reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses and to prescribe proportionate penalties
therefor”).
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guidelines can result in the perverse outcome of a judge sentencing
misdemeanors more harshly than at least some felonies. However, even
in the unlikely event that such an unintended sentencing outcome were
to occur on a regular basis, it is also worth remembering that there is no
bright line between misdemeanor and felony offenses. It is certainly
possible that a judge will consider a particular misdemeanor (such a
serious misdemeanor assault in a domestic violence context) more
serious than a particular felony (such as theft that is just over the felony
monetary threshold).
Local culture and custom can also play a significant role in the
exercise of sentencing discretion. Courthouses are recognized sites of
local culture,140 and the processing of misdemeanor cases—which
includes sentencing in some cases—is a major aspect of lower criminal
court culture.141 Local culture includes custom and practice, and lower
court judges’ perception of local sentencing norms might guide their
discretion. Similarly, judges’ perception of sentences they themselves
have imposed in past cases might guide discretion. However, such
perceptions—unlike actual data comparing various judges’ sentencing
practices within a courthouse or one judge’s sentencing practices for
similarly situated defendants—are often incorrect and biased.142 For
example, a recent Herald-Tribune study demonstrated how the Florida
courts and correctional systems maintain a wealth of sentencing data, yet
“no one uses the data to review racial disparities in sentencing” and
“judges themselves don’t know their own tendencies.”143
There are a number of factors that guide judicial discretion in
felony sentencing. Many of these do not apply to misdemeanors, leaving
the judge with little guidance in determining what sentence to impose
within the legally permissible range. More specifically, the broad
discretion in misdemeanor sentencing means there are a number
of choices a judge could make about what factors to take into
consideration at sentencing.144 The next Part focuses on the most
significant of those factors, namely the disproportionate, often life-long
140. Roth, supra note 70, at 222-24.
141. See generally FEELEY, supra note 45.
142. See Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind Spot”
Biases in Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 524 (2014).
143. See Josh Salman et al., Florida’s Broken Sentencing System: Designed for Fairness, It
Fails to Account for Prejudice, HERALD-TRIBUNE, http://projects.heraldtribune.com/bias/sentencing
(last visited Nov. 15, 2017). The investigation discusses how Florida’s point system does not
account for the racial disparities in sentencing, which can be exacerbated by law enforcement
practices and plea bargaining limitations. Id.
144. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 30, at 190, 192, 201.
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collateral consequences that a person can suffer as a result of facing
misdemeanor charges.
IV.

INFORMED MISDEMEANOR SENTENCING: ACCOUNTING FOR THE
FULL RANGE OF CONSEQUENCES

As noted above, there is no developed theory to justify
misdemeanor punishment. Still, drawing on some of the principles of
punishment set out in Part III, the practice of misdemeanor sentencing
suffers from a lack of proportionality and parsimony. This is in part
because misdemeanor sentencing fails to account for the wide range of
consequences of a misdemeanor conviction, which go far beyond the
penal sanction that the misdemeanor judge imposes at the time of
sentencing.145 Individuals convicted of misdemeanors, as well as their
families and communities, feel the effects of the misdemeanor
conviction long after they finish any sentence, in many aspects of daily
life. The reality of a misdemeanor conviction in an era where digital
criminal records are easily accessible and often accessed is a recent
phenomenon, and it will take time for misdemeanor sentencing to
come to grips with this new reality, both from a theoretical and
practical standpoint.
There are also significant collateral consequences in felony cases.
Indeed, some consequences only attach to a felony conviction.146 The
difference with misdemeanors is that there is a much greater gulf
between the collateral and direct (penal) consequences of a conviction,
with the former usually far outweighing the latter. This can happen in
felony cases as well, particularly with non-incarceratory sentences,
which highlights how there is no bright line between felony and
misdemeanor punishment.147 For example, a young person with no prior
record who is convicted of low-level felony drug possession may not
realistically face any incarceration. Yet he should, if well-informed by
counsel, be concerned about his financial aid if he is enrolled in college,
since the conviction results in the loss of that aid.148 Deportation and
145. As explored above, mere contact with the criminal justice system that results in creation
of a criminal record—whatever the outcome of the case—can cause lasting, serious collateral
consequences. I use “conviction” here because this Article focuses on sentencing, and sentencing
follows a judgment of guilt, with the formal “conviction” happening upon actual imposition of
sentencing.
146. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 6, § 4.
147. See supra text accompanying note 135.
148. See 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2012) (setting out, for any controlled substance possession
conviction, periods of disqualification for one year for a first offense, two years for a second
offense, and indefinite for a third offense); see also id. § 1091(r)(2)(A)–(B) (allowing disqualified
student to regain eligibility after completion of an approved drug rehabilitation program with
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other immigration consequences can also outweigh the direct
consequences of a felony conviction.149 However, individuals charged
with felonies generally face penal sanctions that will understandably be a
major focus of concern and that may well outweigh most—although
certainly not all—collateral consequences.
This Part offers a way to consider misdemeanor sentencing, what I
will call “informed misdemeanor sentencing,”150 that more fully
accounts for the range of consequences of a misdemeanor conviction. It
treats misdemeanor sentencing the way an individual convicted of a
misdemeanor actually experiences the punishment for that offense, in an
attempt to reinvigorate proportionality and parsimony in the practice of
misdemeanor sentencing. Sentencing, unlike other stages of a criminal
case, incorporates both forward- and backward-looking elements.
The former involves, among other things, “offender-oriented
considerations,”151 while the latter concentrates on the facts of the
offense itself. While both types of elements are relevant to felony
punishment, more serious offenses—in particular violent crimes with
victims—call for more weight on the backward-looking aspects of the
inquiry. With most misdemeanors, the scale of inquiry should tilt
heavily towards forward-looking factors, which would include the most
likely, relevant, and serious collateral consequences of the conviction.
Indeed, in some low-level misdemeanor cases, such as quality-of-life
crimes like disorderly conduct or panhandling, the sentencing process
should look almost entirely if not exclusively forward. This is because in
this class of misdemeanor, the very fact of the conviction, and the
sometimes lengthy, humiliating, and harmful process that led up to that
conviction, will usually comprise sufficient if not disproportionately
harsh deserved punishment for the actual offense.
There are a variety of ways that judges can advance principles of
proportionality and parsimony in misdemeanor sentencing. This Part
focuses on two. First, for appropriately proportionate misdemeanor
unnanounced drug testing and additional requirements).
149. See, e.g., Lee v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 1958, 1967 (2017) (finding, in federal drug
trafficking case, that “[t]here is no question that deportation was the determinative issue in Lee’s
decision whether to accept the plea deal.” (internal quotations omitted)). Employment concerns,
such as likely loss of a professional license or disqualification for categories of employment upon
conviction can also overshadow felony sentencing concerns. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. § 2C:51-2 (2014)
(permanently disqualifies from public employment anyone convicted of a serious offense while in
government service).
150. With thanks to Jenia Turner for suggesting the term “informed misdemeanor sentencing.”
151. Berman & Bibas, supra note 25, at 54-55 (“Sentencing requires the use of reasoned
judgment to impose a just and effective punishment. And whereas a defendant’s background and the
criminal justice system’s purposes would be distracting or prejudicial at trial, they are key
considerations at sentencing.”).
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sentencing, lower court judges should be more forward-looking and
expansive when exercising their sentencing discretion, by determining
the appropriate punishment in a manner that accounts for the serious,
relevant collateral consequences an individual will suffer as a result of
the conviction. In some instances, the proportionate approach is to defer
imposition of the sentence to allow the opportunity for an eventual nonconviction outcome. Second, for parsimonious misdemeanor sentencing,
judges should more frequently employ the various available mechanisms
of relief from those collateral consequences of conviction, including
sealing and expungement.
A. Proportionate Misdemeanor Sentencing
As described throughout this Article, the collateral consequences of
a misdemeanor conviction often overshadow any direct criminal
punishment. The criminal court judge does not impose formal collateral
consequences. Rather, these consequences are found in federal, state, or
local regulatory measures and are imposed automatically or as a matter
of discretion after the criminal case ends.152 For example, federal
immigration law mandates deportation for a wide variety of
misdemeanor convictions.153 Informal collateral consequences “do not
attach by express operation of law. Rather, they are informal in origin,
arising independently of specific legal authority, and concern the gamut
of negative social, economic, medical, and psychological consequences
of conviction.”154 For example, landlords increasingly turn to
background screening companies to run checks that include criminal
records, even when not required to do so by law or regulation.155
Although these consequences are also outside the direct control of the
misdemeanor sentencing judge,156 they are relevant to sentencing.

152. See LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGLELE, supra note 3, at ch. 1.
153. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (“Any alien who at any time after admission has
been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a
State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . . other than a
single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is
deportable.”).
154. Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1104
(2013).
155. See Rental Property Solutions, CORELOGIC, http://www.corelogic.com/industry/rentalproperty-solutions.aspx#container-Products (last visited Nov. 15, 2017) (stating that “[p]roperty
operators can review felony, misdemeanor, and sex offender records associated with a potential
applicant in order to make an informed decision about potential renters[,]” and promising to help
review “felony and, where available, misdemeanor records, for a vast majority of states”).
156. Although criminal court judges do not impose most collateral consequences, they do
sometimes have the authority to relieve a defendant of some consequences. See infra Part IV.B.
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Lower court judges can exercise their sentencing discretion to take
into consideration the collateral consequences that a particular individual
is most likely to suffer, when determining what if any criminal
punishment to impose. These consequences will be different for different
defendants, but such individualized review is what discretionary
sentencing is all about. A few examples can help illustrate:


John was convicted after a bench trial of misdemeanor
theft, for shoplifting $100 worth of clothing. Two years
earlier he had benefitted from a pre-plea diversionary
program for a similar charge. The local prosecutor had a
policy against offering diversion twice, so John chose to
take his chances at trial. He did this in large part because
he was a non-citizen, a Legal Permanent Resident
whose parents brought him to the United States as a
toddler. John was aware, because his lawyer offered
competent assistance of counsel as required under the
Sixth Amendment,157 that a theft conviction with a
sentence of one year or more, even if the judge
suspended all of that time, would count as an
“aggravated felony” under federal immigration law and
make him mandatorily deportable.158 John was also
aware, again because his lawyer acted effectively, that
the judge handling his case gave one-year suspended
sentences on all theft convictions, along with one year
of probation and a warning that any violation of that
probation would lead to imposition of the suspended
sentence. Although John was convicted at trial, his
lawyer convinced the judge to impose a 364 day
suspended sentence, arguing that deportation to a
country his client did not even know, with a language
his client did not speak and no remaining family there,
was of such disproportionate consequence that the judge
should moderate the actual, criminal punishment, simply
by one day. This is an easy case under any concept
of proportionality.

157. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel requires criminal defense attorneys to advise clients about mandatory deportation
consequences).
158. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (defining “aggravated felony,” in part as any “theft
offense . . . for which the term of imprisonment [sic] at least one year”); see also id.
§ 1101(a)(48)(B) (“Any reference to a term of imprisonment or a sentence with respect to an
offense is deemed to include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law
regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment or sentence in
whole or in part.”).
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Jane also faced the same charges as John, but she had
several prior convictions that qualified as “aggravated
felonies” under immigration law. At the time of her
arrest, she was also detained on an “immigration hold”
(meaning immigration authorities would seek to take
custody upon her release in the criminal matter),
because she had a final order of deportation based on
her past convictions. The judge imposed a sentence of
“time served” in her case, finding that her near-certain
deportation was punishment enough.159
James was convicted of misdemeanor assault, during an
incident of road rage that took place adjacent to his
public housing complex, as he was exiting the parking
lot. Because of an assault conviction some years prior,
James’s lawyer warned him that he would likely face a
short amount of jail time followed by probation if
convicted. However, upon further discussion with James
in preparation for the sentencing hearing, his lawyer
learned that the local public housing authority (“PHA”)
had notified James that he and his entire family would
lose their public housing apartment because of James’s
conviction, under the PHA’s discretionary authority.160
James’s lawyer was able to convince the judge to refrain
from imposing any jail time, arguing that James and his
family were already suffering disproportionate
consequences of his conviction and that incarceration
might cause James to lose his job and make the family’s
search for new housing even more difficult.161

There are a number of practical concerns about implementing
informed misdemeanor sentencing. First, judges will likely learn of these
collateral consequences only if the defendant is represented by counsel.
For example, John might not qualify for the services of the local public
159. The judge could have been simply saving state and local resources by ending the case then
and turning Jane over to federal immigration authorities, but he would also have had an independent
basis for the “time served” sentence—namely, disproportionality.
160. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.553(a)(2)(ii)(3) (2017) (stating that public housing authorities can
deny individuals and their family members housing benefits if any household member, while
residing in public housing “engage[s] in” any criminal activity that “may threaten the health, safety,
or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents or persons residing in the
immediate vicinity”).
161. To be sure, James’s lawyer might have also argued that practical considerations, namely
the need for James to stay out of jail and stay employed so his family could find new housing
quickly, should lead to the same result. I am focused in this example on disproportionality because
that would be an independent basis on which the judge could decline to impose jail time (and
because this section of the Article is about proportionality).
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defender but also might not be able to afford to hire private counsel.162 If
this were the case, he would likely never learn of the arcane rule in
federal immigration law about how suspended sentences are the same as
imposed sentences. Further, John would likely never imagine that a
shoplifting conviction qualified as an “aggravated felony” under
immigration law and that he was mandatorily deportable.163 Thus, John
would be unable to inform the judge about his immigration situation and
unable to request a proportionate sentence. This highlights the critical
role of defense counsel in misdemeanor sentencing in a world of myriad
collateral consequences. Particularly when it comes to immigration
consequences—which are among the most severe of all collateral
consequences and can apply to long-time legal permanent residents with
green cards and American citizen children and spouses just as to recent
arrivals on a visa—judges should ensure that any non-citizen is
represented by counsel.
Another concern is that the judge may not know about many of the
collateral consequences of various misdemeanor convictions, in order to
effectively integrate consideration of those consequences into
sentencing. Here, there have been significant advances in the availability
of information. For example, the Council of State Governments’ Justice
Center now maintains a public, fifty-state database of collateral
consequences, originally created by the American Bar Association with
funding from the National Institute of Justice.164 In addition, the newlyapproved Model Penal Code: Sentencing (“MPC”) states:
(1) As part of the sentencing guidelines, the sentencing commission [or
other designated agency] shall compile, maintain, and publish a
compendium of all collateral consequences contained in [the
jurisdiction’s] statutes and administrative regulations.
(a) For each crime contained in the criminal code, the compendium
shall set forth all collateral consequences authorized by [the
jurisdiction’s] statutes and regulations, and by federal law.

162. In Montgomery County, Maryland, where my clinic students practice, it is not unusual to
see defendants forced to proceed pro se on the trial date, after having informed the judge on an
earlier date that they would be hiring private counsel because they did not qualify for the public
defender, only to return on the trial date to say they could not afford any of the lawyers they
contacted.
163. See supra note 158.
164. See Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, § 510(a), 121 Stat.
2534, 2543; see also COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CTR., http://ccresourcecenter.org
(last visited Nov. 15, 2017) (offering links to various manuals and databases on collateral
consequences).
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(b) The commission [or designated agency] shall ensure the
compendium is kept current.165

However, these large databases and compendia are blunt tools, and
judges should work to integrate collateral consequences into bench
books or other similarly accessible materials for use at sentencing
and before.
The literature on holistic approaches to criminal defense work is
also informative in the exploration of the judicial role in misdemeanor
sentencing. That well-developed body of work builds on the idea of
client-centered representation and proposes a model that looks beyond
the criminal case to represent the client as a person faced with a variety
of issues that might lead to involvement in the criminal justice system. 166
To be clear, judges occupy a different, and appropriately much more
limited,167 space with respect to asking for or receiving information
about a defendant’s circumstances than defense counsel, and for that
reason the term “informed misdemeanor sentencing” is more
appropriate. However, these limits do not mean that the judge must or
should ignore the significant, lasting ways a conviction and sentence
might negatively affect the person she is sentencing—particularly if
those negative effects are disproportionate to the offense, or run counter
to the purpose of the punishment in the first place.
It is worth pausing to consider the potential net-widening or
punishment-enhancing effect of informed misdemeanor sentencing. Netwidening, as well as class and race biases, are continuing critiques of the
problem-solving court movement.168 Net-widening occurs when law
enforcement and prosecutors bring more individuals into the criminal
justice system on the belief that the system can help them; net-widening
also occurs when individuals who would otherwise be in the system but
would suffer minimal punishment in a traditional courtroom are brought
165. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6x.02 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017).
166. Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral Consequences
and Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067, 1071-73 (2004);
Smyth, supra note 6, at 479-80.
167. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Pinard, supra note 166, at 1079 & nn.54-56, 180.
168. See Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial
Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479 (2004) (critiquing the net-widening effect of drug courts and
stating that drug courts work “by redirecting [low-level] offenders into a treatment system that may
pose significant, perhaps increased, hardships on offenders”); see also Joel Gross, Comment, The
Effects of Net-Widening on Minority and Indigent Drug Offenders: A Critique of Drug Courts, 10
U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 161, 167-68, 171 (2010); Michael M. O’Hear,
Rethinking Drug Courts: Restorative Justice as a Response to Racial Injustice, 20 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 463, 465 (2009) (“In purely quantitative terms, drug courts are unlikely to reduce
[racial] disparities—indeed, if anything, there is reason to believe that drug courts may exacerbate
them.”).
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into a treatment court that imposes more onerous conditions before
termination of the sentence (this has also been seen as punishmentenhancing).169 There is a danger that informed misdemeanor sentencing
can lead to net-widening or punishment-enhancing simply because the
judge has more information under such an approach than under current
approaches to misdemeanor sentencing.
When there is defense counsel in a misdemeanor case, counsel
should work to deliver information about collateral consequences in a
manner designed to get less and not more punishment—in short, counsel
must work to avoid net-widening or punishment-enhancing. Judges must
also refrain from turning a well-intentioned, forward-looking approach
into overly-interventionist sentencing practices, and from using
information gained about collateral consequences at sentencing to
broaden the scope of punishment. Informed sentencing is not about
piling on conditions with a purportedly rehabilitative focus, but rather
about accounting for the true scope of punishment by taking collateral
consequences into consideration.
Using information about the effect of various collateral
consequences on an individual to enhance punishment would fall afoul
not only of proportionality, but also parsimony. Indeed, problem-solving
courts are based on a model of “coerced treatment backed up by firm
judicial monitoring,” and the logic behind such a model “pa[ys] little
heed to proportionality or parsimony” in favor of “participation in
treatment and behavioral controls as long as needed to maximize
their effectiveness.”170
Finally, sometimes the most effective way that judges can exercise
their discretion at sentencing to account for the full range of
consequences an individual experiences as a result of a misdemeanor
conviction is to sentence in a way that avoids the conviction altogether.
Here, a return to the scenarios in Part II are illustrative. Those scenarios
involved the post-plea or post-verdict option of a probation before
judgment (“PBJ”), which is a deferred adjudication (some jurisdictions
may give judges authority to grant pre-plea deferred adjudication, but
this discussion will continue this Article’s focus on sentencing after a
finding of guilt). A PBJ, which is also called a “suspended imposition of
sentence,” “deferred entry of judgment,” and “deferred sentencing,”
among other things,171 stays the entry of any judgment of conviction and
169. O’Hear, supra note 168, at 485-86.
170. Tonry, Sentencing in America, supra note 87, at 173.
171. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-1206 (West 2016) (“suspended imposition of
sentence”); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1000(d), 1000.8(a), (c) (West 2008) (“deferred entry of
judgment”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-102 (2017) (“deferred sentencing”).
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results in a non-conviction discharge of the case upon successful
completion of the probation and any conditions.172 As noted above, such
deferred adjudications do not necessarily relieve collateral
consequences, some of which can be based on the underlying admission
of guilt or the underlying facts of the case.173 Judicial use of such
deferred adjudication avenues can also advance parsimonious
sentencing, the topic of the next Subpart.
B. Parsimonious Misdemeanor Sentencing
In proportionate misdemeanor sentencing, judges take relevant
collateral consequences into account when determining the appropriate
amount of punishment to impose. Judges must be informed about these
consequences for this to happen. To be parsimonious, judges must be
informed about the mechanisms of relief from these consequences, more
specifically those mechanisms that they have power to employ. There
are a variety of avenues of relief from one or more collateral
consequences, although the major judicially-controlled avenues are—in
addition to deferred adjudication described in the previous Subpart—
sealing or expungement of a record, or the granting of some type of
certificate of relief or rehabilitation.174 While these methods of relief can
be complex and are not widely understood or employed by judges,
defense counsel, or prosecutors, it is not difficult for a judge quickly to
become sufficiently knowledgeable about the limited tools for judicially
granted relief.
Using relief mechanisms, so as to “impos[e] . . . the least punitive or
burdensome punishment that will achieve valid social purposes” under
the principle of parsimony175 can also be an exercise in proportionality.
If a judge believes that granting relief from a particular collateral
consequence would result in the least punitive (most parsimonious)
manner of achieving appropriate misdemeanor punishment, then it is
likely that the judge is also acting to better fit the punishment to the
172. See, e.g., MD. CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 6-220(b)(2)(ii), (c)(2), (g)(3) (LexisNexis 2017).
173. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2012) (defining “conviction” to include
circumstances where an “adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where . . . the alien . . . admitted
sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and . . . the judge has ordered some form of
punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed”); 24 C.F.R. § 982.553(c)
(2017) (“The PHA [Public Housing Authority] may terminate assistance for criminal activity by a
household member as authorized in this section if the PHA determines, based on a preponderance of
the evidence, that the household member has engaged in the activity, regardless of whether the
household member has been arrested or convicted for such activity.”).
174. See LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra note 3, at §§ 7:16-7:23 (describing various
mechanisms of judicial relief from collateral consequences).
175. Berman, supra note 90, at 49.
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crime.176 Some of the examples in the preceding Subpart illustrate the
intertwined nature of proportional and parsimonious misdemeanor
sentencing. One further example focuses on parsimony:


Alice was arrested for misdemeanor drug possession for
having oxycodone without a prescription. She had one
prior marijuana possession arrest, from the year before,
which was dismissed upon completion of a brief drug
education class. Alice’s trial date for the new case,
which would normally happen about three months after
her arrest, was delayed as she completed an in-patient
drug treatment program in her home state. Nine months
after Alice’s arrest, she appeared in court. By that time,
she had completed both in- and out-patient programs,
with consistent negative drug tests. In the jurisdiction
where Alice was arrested, the prosecutor would
normally make no sentence offer to someone with a
similar drug arrest and one prior drug arrest, but would
join defense counsel in requesting a deferred
adjudication. Alice decided to plead guilty and request
such a deferral, which the judge granted. The judge was
prepared to sentence Alice to the customary eighteen
months of probation, after which time the case (barring
any violation of probation) would be dismissed and the
disposition deemed a non-conviction. Under state law in
this jurisdiction, Alice would have to complete the
probationary period before seeking expungement of her
record. However, Alice was actively seeking
employment, and the case was showing up as an open
charge on background checks. One employer was
willing to hire Alice, but only upon proof that she was
not convicted of the charges, and expungement of the
record. The judge considered his purpose in punishing
Alice to be rehabilitative, namely ensuring that she got
any necessary drug treatment and was able to move on
with her life and avoid further arrests. Given that goal,
and the fact that Alice had already completed treatment
and was coming to court months after her arrest without
any drug use, Alice’s defense attorney was able to argue

176. In some instances, the judge may not find the collateral consequence too drastic, or
disproportionate given the crime, but may see no regulatory benefit in imposition of the
consequence in the particular case (e.g. no benefit to public safety). Cf. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84,
103-06 (2003) (determining the line between criminal punishment and civil regulatory measures by
examining the legislative intent and the effect of the law, and noting that a public safety purpose is
regulatory).
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for no probationary period, so that Alice was eligible for
immediate expungement.
For now, a judge’s ability to grant relief from collateral
consequences is fairly limited. Although most states have expungement
and sealing laws, some are restricted to non-conviction dispositions and
others to a small group of misdemeanor charges upon conviction.177
Further, not all jurisdictions have certificates of relief or rehabilitation.178
That may change if states adopt the recommendations in the new MPC
relating to relief at sentencing. In an important new provision, the MPC
effectively folds relief from collateral consequences into the sentencing
process. It requires sentencing courts to hear petitions for relief from any
mandatory collateral consequences (meaning the consequence is
automatically imposed) “[a]t any time prior to the expiration of the
sentence.”179 The MPC also allows individuals to petition for a
Certificate of Restoration of Rights, which would grant relief from all
mandatory collateral consequences in the jurisdiction, four years after
completion of all past sentences.180 Quite surprisingly—particularly
given the wave of state legislative reform making sealing and
expungement more available in a wider variety of circumstances,
including for felony convictions after sometimes lengthy waiting
periods181—the new MPC does not include any mechanism for
expungement or sealing of a criminal record.182
There are some simple steps that misdemeanor judges can take to
make available relief mechanisms more easily accessible. For example,
even if not required to do so by law or court rule, judges should advise
defendants—particularly those appearing without counsel—about
sealing or expungement opportunities. Misdemeanor courtrooms should
177. See 50-State Comparison: Judicial Expungement, Sealing, and Set-Aside, RESTORATION
RIGHTS PROJECT, http://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/50-state-comparison
judicial-expungement-sealing-and-set-aside (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
178. LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra note 3, at § 7:23.
179. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6x.04(1)(a)–(b), (2)(a)–(c) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft
2017).
180. Id. § 6x.06(1)–(3)(a), (4).
181. See Roberts, supra note 45, at 322 (“Nationally, a number of states are now updating or
considering new and broader sealing and expungement laws.”).
182. In fact, there is only one brief discussion of expungement in the MPC, which seems to
make the assumption that expungement will go hand-in-hand with provisions allowing individuals
to deny the existence of any expunged record (which some states have) and appears to decline to
include this major, existing relief mechanism on the basis of that possibility. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 6.02B cmt. i at 59. The discussion also states that “expungement is simply not feasible,” but
assumes that individuals expect total erasure of a record upon expungement when in fact
expectations in the electronic age are likely lower and yet even some suppression of the record can
be highly beneficial in the search for employment and housing. See id.
OF
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have the relevant pleadings and paperwork readily available, which will
be especially beneficial for individuals who are immediately eligible to
seek expungement or sealing. Judges should also waive fees to access
such relief when the defendant is unable to pay, whenever they have the
authority to do so.
Another area where judges can be parsimonious in misdemeanor
sentencing is after a finding of a violation of probation, when the judge
is essentially re-sentencing the defendant.183 In 2015, there were more
than 1.5 million individuals on misdemeanor probation.184 Although
there do not appear to be nationwide statistics on the number of
misdemeanor probation violations, arrests and incarceration based on
alleged probation violations are common and well-documented.185 Many
probation violations are related to the inability to pay fees associated
with probation, and a court’s failure to determine whether the lack of
payment was willful rather than based on indigency or financial
constraints is a clear constitutional violation that is outside the scope of
parsimonious misdemeanor sentencing.186 However, for other types of
probation violations—such as failure to perform community service
because the only times offered conflicted with work or child care
obligations—judges can re-sentence parsimoniously, to achieve the
purpose of the sentence in the least punitive or burdensome manner. For
example, the judge might allow the probationer to arrange community
service himself, rather than relying on the probation department for a
placement that is more likely to conflict with other obligations. Or, the
judge might extend the time allowed to complete the community service,
if that would address the underlying reason for the violation (e.g. limited
weekend hours to do community service).
The principle of parsimony, particularly when combined with the
goal of proportional punishment, should lead misdemeanor judges to
183. See, e.g., PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN., Pa. R. Crim. P. R. 708 (West 2016) (“At the
time of sentencing [for a violation of probation], the judge shall afford the defendant the opportunity
to make a statement in his or her behalf and shall afford counsel for both parties the opportunity to
present information and argument relative to sentencing.”).
184. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN
THE UNITED STATES, 2015, at 1, 5 tbl.4 (2017) (noting that 3,789,800 adults were on probation at
“year end 2015, and that 41% of those adults were on misdemeanor probation).
185. See, e.g., CHRIS ALBIN-LACKEY, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: AMERICA’S “OFFENDERFUNDED” PROBATION INDUSTRY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1, 51 (2014), https://www.hrw.org/report
2014/02/05/profiting-probation/americas-offender-funded-probation-industry (“Vast numbers of
arrest warrants are issued every year for offenders on private probation. In Georgia alone, 124,788
arrest warrants were issued for offenders on private probation in 2012.”).
186. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-73 (1983) (holding that it violates the
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause to incarcerate a person based on inability to pay a
fine or restitution).
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find the least burdensome way to mitigate any harmful effects of a
conviction. For misdemeanors, this will almost always mean less
punishment and more use of any available mechanisms of relief from
a conviction.
V.

CONCLUSION

Misdemeanors make up the vast majority of cases in the criminal
justice system. The most significant function of misdemeanor judges is
sentencing. However, that sentencing happens with little guidance and in
a system replete with structural and systemic barriers to the proper
exercise of judicial discretion. Misdemeanor sentencing also lacks a
coherent set of underlying principles, as the purposes and functions of
felony punishment are not a good fit for many misdemeanor offenses.
Further, judges imposing misdemeanor sentences largely fail to
appreciate the full panoply of harmful, long-lasting consequences that
follow a misdemeanor conviction. Labeled collateral, these
consequences often far outweigh the direct penal sanction that the judge
imposes at sentencing.
This Article calls for judges to undertake informed misdemeanor
sentencing. There are numerous ways to sentence so as to account for
the true consequences of a low-level conviction. Proportionate
misdemeanor sentencing would require judges to be more forwardlooking, taking serious collateral consequences into account in
determining the appropriate direct sanction. In many cases, this will
result in a deferred adjudication, which suspends imposition of the
sentence pending completion of conditions, after which the case
essentially ends without a conviction. Parsimonious misdemeanor
sentencing would require judges to make more use of the various
mechanisms of relief from a conviction, such as expungement of the
record or granting of a certificate of rehabilitation.
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